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ABSTRACT
Democracy and the Environment in Latin America
by
Javier Albert Escamilla
Dr. Dennis Pirages, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study examines the ability of democratic and non-democratic
states alike to protect the environment. Democracy has long been an
important concept in the study of politics and environmental protection
is an increasingly important issue in world politics. Advocates of
democracy claim democratic states are better able to protect the
environment than non-democracies. In contrast there are those that
argue democracy’s emphasis on individual rights leads to excessive
resource consumption. This thesis employs a mixed methods approach
to determine if democratic countries protect the environment more than
their non-democratic counterparts. In short democracies do protect the
environment better than non-democracies but certain conditions must be
met. It is argued that democracy is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to ensure greater environmental protection. This study restricts
analysis to Latin America which allows for a more focused and detailed
analysis of cases with various levels of democracy. This allows for greater
inspection as to the effect the institutions have on environmental
protection.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Democracy is an important concern in the study of international
relations and comparative politics. Indeed, Latin American political
research has referred to democracy as the “master concept” since much
of the literature revolves around the use of the term (Munck 2007, 26).
Much literature has focused on the effect that democracy has on dispute
settlement,

peace

processes,

trade

negotiations,

environmental

protection, and international law (Payne 1995; Chan 1997). This work
focuses on the ability of democratic states to protect the environment.
It is claimed by theorists that democracies protect the environment
better than non-democracies (Payne 1995, Paehlke 1988). The most
general reason given is that democratic states are responsible to citizen
groups who petition for a safer living environment. Payne (1995) offers
five reasons why democracies have better environmental conditions:
individual

rights,

regime

responsiveness,

political

learning,

internationalism, and open marketplace of ideas.
Each reason given assumes certain actions will be performed and
that the institutions will be responsive to citizen demands. The claim
that individual rights will lead to citizen demands for environmental
protection. It is more likely that citizens in developing states will demand
greater social equity. Regime responsiveness assumes states have the
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resources to respond. In other words the claim assumes states have the
capacity in terms of organization, expertise, and fiscal resources to
enforce environmental regulations. Political learning assumes elite has
emerged willing to address the problem of environmental degradation.
However, depending upon how a state transitioned to democracy will
determine how institutions function. In many cases a transition to
democracy does not result in a transfer of power (i.e. Guatemala 1988,
Chile 1990). Internationalism assumes foreign states will petition and/or
share technologies to protect the environment. This ignores foreign
state’s preoccupation with only those areas that affect the international
commons (i.e. air and oceanic pollution). Finally, open market place of
ideas assumes such ideas will be acted upon. Simply because a state
becomes democratic does not necessarily mean that heretofore neglected
ideas will be heeded. All the reasons Payne points to are debatable
especially since individual rights are the cause, according to some for
environmental degradation.
By contrast some theorists claim democracy’s emphasis on
individual rights leads to excessive

consumption, overpopulation,

corruption, and negligence (Ophuls 1973; Ehrlich 1989; Hardin 1968;
and Heilbroner 1980). The view by these authors is the emphasis on
individual rights, especially economic rights, inevitably leads to an
overall decline of the community’s right to a clean environment as a
result of excessive use of the environment. Ophuls (1973) critiques the
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claim by economists that technological breakthroughs will overcome
resource scarcity. In his opinion, increased technological capacity
depends on scarce resources; which entails greater extraction of scarcer
materials. This makes the costs of production rise while the quantity of a
product does not rise. Ehrlich (1989) argues that unrestricted population
growth leads to increasingly polluted land. In a democracy growth cannot
be restricted nor can consumption patterns which lead to greater use of
the commons. Heilbroner (1980) argues that in democratic states the
business elite have greater influence than the average citizen. The elite
will oppose any efforts that hurt their interests. This is a possibility but it
is equally possible under authoritarian rule as it is under democratic
rule.
This paper explores the ability of states democratic and nondemocratic alike to protect the environment. The argument Payne and
others put forth may be valid but require institutions responsive to the
population,

non-clientelistic

behavior

in

political

affairs

and

the

bureaucracy, along with greater economic equality. However, all too often
authors consider an idealized version of democracy which does not
parallel reality in many respects. The idealization of democracy is
common and for this reason a subsequent section examines various
conceptualizations and measurements of democracy. In short, most
measures of democracy examine procedural aspects. These measures
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neglect

levels

of

representativeness

which

is

what

advocates

of

democracy assume exist in all democracies.
This chapter proceeds as follows. A review of the theoretical
literature is provided followed by a review of the empirical literature. The
following section addresses the question, what is democracy? The final
section examines the importance of institutions in the democratic
process and how the balance of power within the state determines the
ability of the state to protect the environment.
Theoretical Review
Payne’s theoretical framework has been the most referenced work
regarding the relationship between democracy and the environment. His
attention to political rights has been the source of protection, giving
support for those that advocate democracy. Most attention has been
given to political rights and how the free flow of information will allow
environmental groups to raise awareness of issues and push for
legislation (Schultz and Crockett 1990; Payne 1995). Under democratic
rule environmental groups are more easily formed and have more
influence over public opinion and more access to individual legislators
than under authoritarian rule. Kotov and Nikitina (1995) claim
democracies are more responsive to environmental needs as a result of
electoral accountability, and the ability of groups to mobilize and achieve
political representation. Democracies are said to have greater respect for
the rule of law which leads them to follow environmental agreements
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more than non-democracies (Weiss and Jacobsen 1999). Congleton
(1992) argues elites, who are presumed to be less pro-environment,
control the political process in authoritarian states which prevents
environmental protection. Congleton also notes that authoritarian
regimes have a shorter time horizon than democracies. Authoritarian
rulers care less about long term consequences because they may not be
in power when the negative externalities become readily apparent.
Those who claim democracy leads to greater environmental
protection make many assumptions. The first is the willingness of the
masses to petition the state to protect the environment. In many poor
states people may be willing to tolerate some environmental degradation
for faster economic growth. This perspective also assumes there are
channels

of

influence

within

the

state

that

are

accessible

to

environmental groups. They assume the state has the resources and
ability to respond to the demands of the masses. Yet state capacity has
not been addressed in the literature, a shortcoming addressed in the
following chapters. Environmental protection requires expertise, constant
oversight, and the ability to enforce laws which many states (democratic
and authoritarian alike) do not possess. Environmental degradation
comes in many forms which leads to numerous environmental groups
that many assume will be homogenous; this assumption may not be
true. A final assumption is that elected officials control the resources of
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the state but in Latin America the distribution of power is mixed and
varied leading Karl (1995) to label many regimes “hybrid regimes.”
There are theorists who claim democracy’s emphasis on individual
rights and economic freedoms lead to greater environmental degradation.
These theorists provide convincing theoretical support for Hardin’s
(1968) famous “tragedy of the commons” which holds that unrestricted
use of the commons leads to excessive consumption, environmental
mismanagement, and unrestricted resource exploitation. This oft cited
work

demonstrates

what

is

individually

rational

is

collectively

suboptimal. For this reason the collective action problem is an important
issue to environmental protection. Paehlke (1996) argues that the
economy and environment have global significance while democracy
functions only at the local or national level. This does, however, neglect
the fact that most environmental problems are national, regional or local.
Also, proposed solutions to environmental problems are often local.
Heilbroner (1974) and Ehrlich (1978) point to the inability of democratic
states to restrict the growth of the population which then leads to greater
resource consumption. Democracies tend to be market economies which
give business groups greater clout in the political process than
environmental groups (Dryzek 1968). Midlarsky (1998) points to gridlock
over environmental protection issues. Gridlock occurs because elected
politicians want to win as many votes as possible which leads to greater
compromises on environmental issues.
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Those who claim democracy leads to greater environmental
degradation assume authoritarian regimes will protect the environment.
This would occur if “ecological kings” were to govern the state, but if
history is to be a guide economic growth is of greater importance than
environmental protection to democracies and authoritarian regimes
alike. Dryzek’s (1987) claim that the elite control the political process
under democracy is just as true under authoritarian regimes. The
gridlock

that

Midlarsky

(1998)

points

to

will

not

occur

under

authoritarian rule simply because such issues will not be considered to
begin in the first place. When there is a lack of environmental
degradation it has been the result of an inability to exploit the resource
as opposed to a desire to protect. The claim by Heilbroner (1974) and
Ehrlich (1978) is complicated but population trends indicate greater
economic growth leads to slower population growth. The lag it takes for
this to occur does however pose problems for the environment. The
proponents of democracy put forth an idealized version of democracy
while the critics of democracy implicitly assume authoritarian rulers
would have more capacity.
Background Literature
The relationship between democracy and the environment has
been addressed sparsely in the literature and has lacked large-N
statistical analysis. This is partly due to a lack of quality data on
environmental indicators which has plagued the area of environmental
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politics in general. Only certain indicators have been recorded for a long
period of time. The indicators which have sufficient data for time-series
analysis are: carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), PM10, and protected land
as a percentage of total land (PROTECT). The existing literature, which is
reviewed below, shows mixed results and questionable findings.
The

research

environmental

by

conditions

Midlarsky
and

(1998)

uses

three

examines
different

five

types

of

measures

of

democracy. However, his research is limited in scope because it only
looks at one point in time as opposed to looking at how states treat their
territory over a period of time. The conclusions he arrives at show that
democracy is not better at preventing a rise in CO2 emissions, soil
erosion, or deforestation. The only variable that showed democracy is
best for the environment is protected land area; democracy had no effect
on fresh water availability or soil erosion by chemicals (358). His results
are mixed and the lack of time-series analysis results in an inability to
conclude if environmental degradation is subject to change with time
under either regime type.
Congleton (1992) claims democracies have stricter environmental
regulations than non-democracies, but he is unable to demonstrate if
regulations are enforced. He also focuses on international environmental
agreements, such as the Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Convention,
and concludes democracies sign environmental agreements more than
authoritarian regimes. However, today the results would be different
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because most states have signed both agreements. At most he can claim
democracies sign sooner, but we are still unable to determine if states
live up to said agreements. Neumayer (2002) examines multi-lateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) and concludes democracies commit
themselves to more environmental agreements than non-democracies.
Neumayer’s study has the same problem as Congleton (1992), namely
the lack of information on ability to enforce regulations. Many states
could sign and never live up to the agreement’s principles. It also fails to
tell us what the internal costs of compliance are. For instance Mali is a
member to the International Whaling Commission (IWC) but it does not
whale so signing the agreement does not hurt Mali’s interests.
Barret and Graddy (2000) effectively show that democracy lowers
sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions but the results for water pollution were
not statistically significant. Torras and Boyce (1998) find higher levels of
democracy leads to lower air pollution, SO2 and particulate emissions,
and decreases water pollution. Scruggs (1998) finds results opposite to
those of Torras and Boyce (1998) despite using the same environmental
indicators. These results raise questions about the robustness of
democracy as a predictor of environmental conditions.
Li and Reuveny (2006) use time series data and a large data set to
look at five environmental indicators: CO2 emissions, nitrogen oxide, land
degradation, deforestation, and organic pollution in water. The main
shortcoming is that they did not include a regional indicator to
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distinguish the developing world from the developed world. The analysis
which shows democracies do protect the environment better may simply
be a result of state capacity not necessarily democracy. The richer
countries have less pollution per capita than poorer countries which tend
to be authoritarian1. The missing variable is the ability of states to
protect

the

environment.

Another

problem

is

the

environmental

indicators used, especially deforestation, is something that was not
occurring in the developed world simply because those forests had been
deforested prior to the time horizon of the analysis.
It should be clear that prior research has had limitations,
methodological problems, and that the statistical results of some studies
contradict the findings of others. For these reasons further work on this
question is warranted. This research begins with statistical analysis to
determine whether democratic states protect the environment better than
non-democracies. The findings, not surprisingly are mixed. Therefore,
qualitative work must be conducted to determine why some democratic
states protect the environment more than others and if there is a
difference between authoritarian states and democratic states.

The main exception to this would be the United States which pollutes more than most
if not all developing states.
1
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What is Democracy?
Democracy has been among the most important concepts in the
study of comparative politics but as yet there is no consensus as to how
it should be defined or how to measure it. Various measurements have
been advocated that could be called maximalist, minimalist, and
procedural. There are weaknesses in each. Maximalist definitions lead to
too narrow a concept which limits the generalization and minimalist
definitions typically examine only elections which neglects “who exercises
power” (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 12). For example the President of
Iran is elected, but it is the Supreme Leader who has “effective” control
over the political process and the military. So while Iran may appear to
be democratic under the minimalist definition it is not under other
definitions. The two approaches lead to what Collier and Levitsky (1997)
refer to as “democracy with adjectives” which refers to the creation of
new concepts which have little use.
As noted above democracy is said to alleviate many of society’s ills,
but not much thought (in previous empirical work on this topic) has been
given to the conceptualization and measurement of democracy. The
literature reviewed above refers to data mostly from Freedom House or
the Polity IV datasets. However, there are limitations to both which lead
to substantive differences. Freedom House has many components under
its two attributes “political rights” and “civil liberties” which are not
necessarily related. The Polity IV dataset identifies “competitiveness” and

11

“regulation of participation” which are two of the most important
components of democracy, but not sufficient to address the question of
“who effectively governs.” Another issue of concern is “replicability” as
only Polity IV grants enough information to replicate the dataset with
precision. Freedom House lacks inter-coder testing and the information
necessary to replicate the data (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 19-20). This
means that different people looking at the same data could lead different
classifications.
Most regimes in Latin America (and elsewhere) do not fully satisfy
the requirements of democracy, namely civilian control over the military,
which makes a dichotomous variable less robust. As a result the
dichotomous

dataset

established

by

Przeworski

et

al

(2000)

is

insufficient. Przeworski et al (2000) reject the existence of borderline
regimes between democracy and authoritarian, but such dichotomy
neglects the procedural nature of democratization. No contemporary state
emerged from authoritarian rule fully democratic. Institutions which
protect political rights, civil liberties and foster democratic participation
require time and experimentation to develop. For these reasons the Polity
dataset will be used.
Any classification of democracy must include the components
which are necessary for effective representation yet not broad enough to
be inapplicable. The most stringent democracy characterization would be
Robert Dahl’s classic contribution (1971). However, the opposite is
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equally true and just as common. Przeworski et al (2000) and
Schumpeter (1942) give great importance to procedural aspects of free
and fair elections, but scant attention to the protection of political rights
and civil liberties which enable free and fair elections to occur. The Polity
dataset may have its flaws but in comparison to the rest it is superior.
However, it will be seen that many states categorized as democratic
do not represent the people which elected them. This is a result of weak
institutions and political patronage appointments. Such appointments
compromise the ability of many state institutions to establish policies
which benefit society. Many studies of democracy rest upon the belief
that democracy represents the interests of the masses. This is not always
the case though. Most states categorized as democratic in the various
indices get at the procedural dimensions of democracy not how
representative the state is. Representative democracies are those states
that achieve the procedural dimension of democracy but also listen to
and act upon the demands of the population. It is the representative
nature that inherently makes democracy more suitable to environmental
protection.

However,

none

of

the

democracy

indices

measure

representativeness for this reason statistical analysis can be misleading.
Consequently this study uses a mixed methods approach to
determine statistically the relationship between democracy and the
environment. The statistical analysis is followed by comparative case
studies of states with differing regime types and various levels of
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representativeness. If all democratic states were representative statistical
analysis would not be as disparate as it currently is. However,
representativeness also assumes states have the capacity to respond to
the demands of the populace. For this reason the following section
examines state capacity and its impact on environmental protection.
Other Factors Affecting Environmental Protection
The ability of the state, or state capacity, is essential to
environmental protection. State capacity refers to the ability of states to
“have the capacity, in terms of organizational cohesion, expertise, and
extractive and coercive ability, to carry out decisions based on their
preferences” (Geddes 1990, 217). In other words, state capacity refers to
the ability of the state to perform its delegated duties. In many instances
the state is incapable of performing. This can come about for a number
of reasons including powerful interests in society, military threat, lack of
experience and expertise, incompetence, and uncommitted bureaucrats.
Weyland (1996) identifies three forms of organization: personalism,
segmentalism, and universalism (32-37). Universalism implies that the
bureaucracy puts the interests of the state before their own interests and
views the whole citizenry as their constituency. Segmentalism is when
bureaucracy responds to a narrow group and their demands. The final
category is personalism, or clientelism, whereby businesspeople ask for
particular favors and hinder collective action among civil society. The

14

type of organization that typifies the bureaucracy is going to have
important effects on achieving state goals.
There are institutional features that can also prevent the ability of
the state to act upon environmental degradation. Principally the
delegation of powers within the state can hinder or foster the ability of
the state to enact reform. The powers of the executive over the
bureaucracy, powers to create legislation, and control the legislative
agenda affect a leader’s ability to initiate reform. The formation and
organization of party systems greatly affects the ability of legislatures to
pass laws. In a state with a highly fragmented party system it is much
more difficult to get legislation passed. The powers of the bureaucracy
are central to the implementation of legislation. When the bureaucracy is
given too much autonomy rent seeking and clientelistic behavior is more
likely2. The opposite is equally troublesome. Too much oversight could
lead to selective policy implementation based upon an elected official’s
interests. A proper balance must be developed among the executive,
legislature, and the bureaucracy to ensure clientelistic behavior is not
rampant.
Geddes (1994) notes three prerequisites for the state bureaucracy:
expertise in bureaucratic agencies, an efficient concentration of scarce
resources, and a committed bureaucracy to achieve goals so as to keep
Rent seeking refers to bureaucrats using their position of influence as a way to extract
monetary benefits from individuals pursuing their own self-interests. In contrast
clientelistic behavior refers to bureaucrats serving only certain sectors of the
population.
2
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jobs (218). Implied in these three characteristics is a bureaucracy
susceptible to losing their jobs for poor performance, non-clientelistic
behavior, and bureaucrats with expertise. In addition to these factors I
would add administrative autonomy from elected officials. When a
fragmented party system exists the executive must make concessions for
short term political survival which leads to appointment of nontechnocratic officials in bureaucratic positions which control significant
resources. This is what Geddes (1994) refers to as “the politician’s
dilemma.” A proper balance is needed though. A bureaucracy too
constrained will be unable to look at the nation as a whole as its
constituency, only the interests of the traditional elite will be heeded
(Weyland 1996). The universalist perspective would lead bureaucrats to
disregard the demands of politicians to pursue the best interests of the
public at large. A key component to measuring competence in the
bureaucracy is entrance exams and the absence of life tenure systems.
Both of these components have been misused in Latin America which
has hindered the ability of the state to address many facets of social life.
An essential component of democracy is the ability of civil society
groups to emerge. Such groups have emerged across Latin America but
their success has been uneven. This is due to fragmented institutions
within states which allows for the continued practice of clientelism.
Another problem with civil society groups is they have divergent interests
which are not necessarily compatible. Therefore, the homogeneity often
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assumed by civil society advocates is often absent (Diamond 1994).
Furthermore, many of the bureaucratic institutions that civil society
must petition for reform are political appointments and therefore do not
concern themselves with public opinion. These bureaucrats shape
policies which serve their own interests or the interests of the industrial
sectors they represent. For this reason civil society groups have not been
effective in pushing for reform.
For all these reasons democracy does not function the way many
suppose. Many take an idealized version of democracy which ignores
political reality. This reality demands political compromises on certain
issues. Many states have institutions which were designed to be weak
and to cause gridlock (Ames 2001). This gridlock ensures the continued
status quo. It also allows for the traditional elite to control the policy
process so it serves their interests not the interests of society as a whole.
For all these reasons it is necessary to examine institutions within a
state. How they were created, why they were created, the intention of
those who created the institutions, and the power of the institutions
must be examined to discern why environmental protection is only
sometimes addressed. In short, democracy is not the panacea many
presume it to be. It can be made effective but the establishment of
institutions in the early phases of the transition affects the state’s ability
to conduct affairs with impartiality.
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Plan of the Thesis
The second chapter attempts to improve upon the existing
statistical analysis using appropriate regression techniques. However,
the

data

determines

the

techniques

used

and

as

always

with

environmental data the quality of data is questionable. In short the
statistical analysis shows that democracies are not better protectors of
the environment. This thesis defends the advocates of democracy but
with certain caveats. Democracies protect the environment better but the
state needs two factors to do so: the resources (in terms of economic
resources and technical expertise) to protect the environment and the
will to do so. It is not sufficient for the people to want greater
environmental protection the state must have the capacity to protect the
environment and the willingness to do so. In many states people want
greater environmental protection but due to institutional weakness,
fragmented political parties, weak executives, and clientelistic oriented
bureaucracies words do not turn into action. For these reasons I argue
democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for greater
environmental protection. The work herein focuses on the distribution of
power within the state. Specifically the powers of the executive, the
legislature, and the bureaucracy are examined. Some would caution
against such an approach for most environmental problems are local,
regional, or global not necessarily national. The unit of analysis,
however, will remain at the national level for two reasons. First, data
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availability is at the national level. Second, most environmental decision
making occurs at the national level (Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2002, 57).
For these reasons analysis is restricted to the national level which is
where state resources are distributed and political power is concentrated.
Non governmental organizations (NGOs) are examined in the comparative
case studies to see how they influence policy. The importance of NGOs is
secondary to that of the state. This is a result of the state having the
necessary resources to enforce environmental protection. The role of
NGOs is simply to push the state to act and is therefore of secondary
importance.
The third and fourth chapters examine institutional arrangements
within four Latin America states. More specifically, I will examine formal
powers of the executive and the legislature. Much literature that focuses
on the institutional capabilities of various states examines the formal
powers of the legislature and the executive independently of each other.
This, however, is an inadequate approach. Shugart and Carey (1992)
rightly recommend the examination of the distribution of power within
the state. Each branch must be considered with regard to the power of
the other. In essence, power is a zero sum game even in domestic
politics. The autonomy and effectiveness of the bureaucracy is examined,
especially its relationship with the executive and legislature, to determine
the type of influence civil society groups can have. Civil society groups
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are examined in each chapter to determine their influence in the policy
process.
Chapter two contrasts two states categorized as democratic Brazil
and Costa Rica. Brazil has a poor record of environmental protection,
while Costa Rica has been a leader in the area. These states were chosen
because they have many commonalities aside from being democratic,
including

having

strong

legislatures,

a

populace

that

demands

environmental protection, relatively high levels of economic wealth, and a
lot of biodiversity. In other words both states have the necessary
resources to protect the environment and the populace demanding such
protection. Chapter three contrasts two states categorized as either not
democratic (Guatemala) or semi-democratic (Chile). These states were
chosen because they have one of the two necessary requisites to
environmental protection. Guatemala has lacked the resources for
protection yet the population has demanded protection; Chile has lacked
the demand to protect the environment yet has the resources to do so if
compelled to. The final chapter makes comparisons across all four states
and makes the case as to how democracy is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for environmental protection.
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CHAPTER 2

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The relationship between democracy and the environment has
been previously investigated by Li & Reuveny (2006), Midlarsky (1998),
Congleton (1992), Neumayer (2002), Barret and Graddy (2000), Torras
and Boyce (1998), and Scruggs (1998). These studies have had
limitations which have been reviewed in the preceding chapter. This
study departs from previous work by focusing upon Latin America
exclusively and on the time period of 1975-2007.
This study is unique in its use of cross sectional time series
analysis to focus on a developing region. This strategy has certain
benefits. First, it permits comparison of states that have similar cultures
and political experiences. The concentration on a geographic region helps
isolate the origins of environmental protection. A global analysis may
mistakenly attribute the cause of environmental protection to democracy
when in fact the cause could reside elsewhere (e.g. level of development).
By examining a particular region, with similar political culture we can
determine other sources of environmental protection. It allows us to
compare states at different levels of economic development and different
levels of democracy. The former difference allows us to examine state
capacity. Richer states have the ability in terms of fiscal resources and
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human capital to make environmental protection work. The latter
difference allows for comparisons across regime types.
A necessary prerequisite for environmental protection to occur in
any state is demand from the citizenry for such protection. In any state,
democratic or not, environmental protection will not be an issue, unless
there is some segment of the population is pushing an environmental
agenda. Table 2.1 shows the position of respondents in Latin America
that favor environmental protection even if it leads to slower economic
growth. Respondents have consistently placed environmental protection
above economic growth. This runs contrary to Maslow’s “hierarchy of
needs” argument which holds only when basic needs are met will
aesthetic concerns become an issue of concern. The majority of citizens
in Latin America live in poverty, according to World Bank classification.

Table 2.1 Public Opinion toward Environmental Protection
Year
Environment
Economic Growth
1995
29%
21%
2000
53%
31%
2005
61%
28%
Source: World Values Survey

Expertise
57%
53%
62%

The column environment shows that respondents over time have
increasingly favored environmental protection even at the expense of
economic growth. The column economic growth shows the percentage of
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respondents

favoring

economic

growth

at

the

expense

of

the

environment. This column peaks in year 2000 then drops in 2005;
whereas respondents favoring the environment have continuously grown.
Despite low levels of wealth, the masses are increasingly demanding
greater environmental protection. Another necessary condition for
environmental protection is that bureaucratic recruitment be based on
merit; this condition has not been met in Latin America. Table 2.1 also
shows how the public feels about “experts” making policy decisions. A
majority is consistently in favor of experts injecting expertise into policy
making. This condition has been problematic in many states as a result
of patronage appointments. Patronage appointments are made for a
number of reasons such as to build electoral coalitions, reward voter
support, or simple rent seeking behavior. The respondents favoring
experts in positions of influence illustrates the discord between society
and political elites who continue patronage appointments. It is clear that
respondents in Latin America favor meritocratic recruitment.
Statistical Models
The regression model used in this analysis is a pooled time series
cross sectional (TSCS). In time series analysis a given time point is the
unit of analysis whereas in panel analysis it is the individual, in this case
the state (Markus 1979, 7). This model has the additional benefit of
capturing variation across units and time which has the subsequent
effect of more confident results (Sayrs 1989, 7).
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This analysis differs from other studies in that a greater emphasis
is on the state’s ability, or lack thereof, to protect the environment. For
this reason appropriate variables are included to measure state capacity,
namely gross domestic product per capita (GDP2) and tax revenue as a
percentage of GDP.3
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in this analysis follow previous research
by focusing on anthropocentric sources of environmental degradation.
The dependent variable4 with the longest time series is carbon dioxide
emissions per capita (CO2) for the years 1975-2005. A second measure is
protected area (PROTECT) as a percentage of total land area for the years
1990-2004. A third measure is PM10 (PM10), measured by microgram
per cubic meter, covers the period of 1990-2005. This variable is
normalized with gross domestic product (not per capita) to control for
differences in economic size. The indicator reflects the level of industrial
activity, the pollution from which is the source of respiratory problems
throughout the developing world. While these indicators were chosen as
a result of their availability they do provide useful comparisons with
other states. For instance CO2 and PROTECT are both of significant
interest to the international community. In contrast, PM10 is of little

3 All abbreviations inside parenthesis refer to the output used in STATA for this reason
subscripts will not be used.
4
The data used in this analysis is also largely used in previous statistical work. The
data were collected from the WDI the sole exception is Protected land as a percentage of
total land which comes from the UN Statistics Division.
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importance to the international community therefore does not receive
much attention from the international community simply because the
hazard posed by this type of pollution does not cross borders whereas
the others do. However, it is still a good indicator of environmental
degradation.
Independent Variables
The measure of democracy used will be the Polity dataset. This
variable has been used in much of the empirical literature reviewed
above and in other fields as well. The Polity data have been found to be
more reliable and accurate than Freedom House data by Mainwaring et
al (2007). The difference between Polity and Freedom House data is the
emphasis on different aspects of democracy. Polity specifically looks at
measuring political competition; whereas Freedom House focuses on
political rights and civil liberties. The Polity dataset ensure inter-coder
reliability whereas Freedom House does not5.
Appropriate control variables are necessary to prevent spurious
correlations and/or omitted variable bias. For this reason theoretically
relevant variables are introduced to get at the source of environmental
protection. The control variables used in this analysis largely follow
previous empirical work. Gross domestic product per capita (in constant
2000 U.S. dollars) is introduced in response to Maslow’s “Hierarchy of
Needs” hypothesis and the Environmental Kuznets curve literature. The
Inter-coder reliability refers to the ability of multiple individuals looking at the same
data, with the same rule making, coming to the same conclusion.
5
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expectation is that as GDP/capita increases pollution will decrease. This
is expected for two reasons. First, an increased standard of living results
in a shift to more aesthetic concerns (Maslow 1943). Second, it is
expected that as states generate more wealth the potential to protect the
environment

is

strengthened.

However,

the

relationship

between

GDP/capita and environmental protection may be non-linear. To correct
for non-linearity in the model, the squared term of GDP is used, (GDP2 is
the name of the variable in the model results).
A proxy measure of state capacity is the ability of state’s to tax its
populations. This measure does not vary as a result of regime type.
Rather, tax rates vary only as a result of state capacity (Cheibub 1998).
Tax as a percentage of total state revenue (TAX) is introduced to measure
state capacity. It is expected that as tax rates increase the ability of the
state to perform its delegated duties and achieve its goals will be
enhanced (Hendrix 2009; Cheibub 1998; Garrett 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar
1999). This covariate was dropped for the CO2 model for two reasons.
The data gathered only began in the 1990s to early 2000s, and, for this
reason, would not affect the other variables. Since CO2 begins in 1975
the n-size is drastically reduced and analysis would not begin until the
1990s.
Population change (POPCH) is another variable excluded by much
of the literature. As population increases, the strain on the carrying
capacity of the natural environment also increases leading to greater
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environmental degradation (Malthus 2004, Hardin 1968, Ophuls 1977).
The data have been gathered as a percentage change over the years
1975-2004 from the WDI database. In the context of this model it is
expected that as population increases environmental conditions will
worsen.
Trade openness (TRADE) is expected to decrease environmental
pollution. The control for trade is included to test Payne’s hypothesis that
a freer market place of ideas will lead to greater environmental
protection. In other words Payne assumes a free market place of ideas
will lead to cleaner technologies being used. This measure allows us to
determine how open a state is to foreign investment. A parallel to this
would be: the freer an economy is to trade the more likely cleaner
technologies will be adopted from abroad. This model follows Li and
Reuveny’s (2006) technique which holds that the sum of exports and
imports divided by GDP (not per capita) will gauge the level of openness
in the economy.
Each dependent variable is lagged (t-1) and included as an
independent variable to correct for correlation among error terms within
each unit (state). To control for heteroscedasticty panel corrected
standard errors (PCSE) is used (Beck & Katz 1995; 1996). The high R2 is
a consequence of this technique but is required for proper specification6.

6

The R2 for CO2 would be .49, for PM10 .35, and for PROTECT .47 otherwise.
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Results
Table 2.2 displays the results. Beginning with the model for CO2,
we find that the POLITY index does have a significant effect on CO2
emissions. However, the direction of the coefficient indicates that as
democracy increases so too do emissions. This is contrary to what the
advocates of democracy predict. GDP2 is significant and shows as states
become wealthier a rise in emissions follows. The last variable that shows
significance, albeit not at the standard social science threshold, is
POPCH which shows an increase in population will lead to a rise in
emissions. No other variables had significance and all significant
variables led to a rise in CO2 emissions.
The data for PM10 has the least variables achieving significant
levels. An interesting finding is that an increase in TAX leads to an
increase in PM10 emissions, again not at the traditional .05 level. No
other variables were significant for this model. The final model is
PROTECT which also had interesting findings. The POLITY variable
achieves significance at the .1 level and shows that an increase in
democracy leads to lower levels of protect land. Population change shows
an increase in protected land with an increase in population. No other
variables achieved significant levels. This analysis has shown that
contrary to what advocates of democracy presume environmental
protection is not assured under democratic rule.
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Table 2.2 Effect of Level of Democracy on Environmental
Degradation
CO21
PM102
PROTECT3
POLITY

.0008***
(.0003)

7.56e+08
(2.30e+09)

-.0140*
(.0072)

GDP2

2.87e-09**
(1.39e-09)

-2707.21
(3529.388)

-7.38e-10
(1.32e-08)

POPCH

.0239*
(.0142)

-8.14e+10
(7.75e+10)

.5417*
(3120)

TAX

n/a
n/a

.1684*
(.0720)

.0383
(.0348)

TRADE

.0340
(.0238)

-1.39e+10
(5.69e+10)

-.1722
(.2753)

LAGt-1

.9739***
(.0181)

.9912***
(.0108)

.9711***
(.0214)

Constant

-.0365
(.0448)

3.51e+11
(2.31e+11)

-.4139
(.7358)

Observations

522

132

121

R2
.97
.99
.97
1 TAX was excluded from the analysis because it dropped the n-size by over 300
observations and shortened the time horizon of data
2 Argentina is an outlier and was excluded from analysis
3 Venezuela is an outlier and was excluded from analysis
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%
Outliers were found using scatter plots of their residuals

Conclusions
The results of the regressions are contrary to the findings of many
advocates of democracy. The variables that reach significance show that
the environment is not better protected under democratic rule.
Furthermore, the variable expected to measure state capacity (TAX) is in
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contradiction to what is expected in stronger states. The variable TRADE
achieves no significance in any of the models despite robust findings in
the model provided by Li and Reuveny (2006) and statistical analysis
runs counter to other studies and contributes to the empirical confusion
about the relationship between democracy and the environment. The
TRADE variable account for variations among states with regard to the
influence of market forces and the ability of states to adopt “green”
technologies.
This study is not without limitations. For instance the same
models used here but with a global population could find different
results. An important indicator that would need to be included is an
indicator that would distinguish states based upon their level of
economic development. An excellent classification system would be the
World Bank categories. This indicator was not used in this analysis due
to multicollinearity problems and Latin America does not meet the full
spectrum of the classification.
The theoretical confusion and the mixed results of previous
empirical work in addition to the results of this analysis demonstrate the
need for qualitative research. Even if the results of statistical analysis
were consistent across studies qualitative research would be needed
given the questionable reliability of environmental data.
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The case studies that follow are contrary to the statistical analysis.
The cases show how democratic states do protect the environment better
than less democratic states. The substantive difference among states is
the distribution of power within the state. This is something that has not
been quantified, which furthers the need for case studies. A proper
balance of power will make reform more likely which is necessary for
environmental protection. It cannot be expected that the first efforts will
be effective it takes time and experimentation to determine what will
work. A state that inhibits reform from taking place will lead to unabated
environmental degradation. The autonomy of the bureaucracy is also
examined to determine the capacity of the state to achieve its stated
goals. For these reasons the next two chapters conduct comparative case
studies to show how the distribution of powers within the state lead to
significant differences in environmental protection.
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CHAPTER 3

BRAZIL AND COSTA RICA
Brazil and Costa Rica are among the most affluent states in Latin
America. These political systems are democratic and people are
outspoken on issues. These states share many characteristics in their
political institutions. Both are presidential, and have a legislature
formally endowed with strong power relative to the executive. They also
have a strong independent judiciary. The legislature has, however, ceded
much power to the executive. The reasons for this are partly explained by
the political system itself. In Costa Rica legislators are not permitted
immediate re-election. This prevents the accumulation of policy expertise
and the formation of standing committees to address issues of a long
term nature. For this reason much policy begins with the executive and
the cabinet; the latter are especially adept at policy making for there are
no restrictions on the time they may serve. In Brazil the party system is
highly fragmented and party discipline is non-existent; this is why the
legislature produces very little policy. These are important differences
which have resulted in significant differences in policy outcomes.
Brazil and Costa Rica have two ingredients necessary for
environmental protection – the resources to protect the environment and
public demand for such protection. Many states have neither.

Some

have one but not the other. But it is necessary to have both. A third
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ingredient that must be added is a system open to reform which Costa
Rica has and Brazil lacks. Environmental protection requires heavy
investment which stipulates a healthy economy which both states have.
The average GDP/capita7 in Latin America is USD 2,804. Brazil and
Costa Rica are above that average with USD 3,503 and USD 3,480
respectively. This shows that both are in a better position, relative to the
average state in Latin America, to protect the environment if compelled to
do so.
This leads to the other necessary prerequisite – the desire to
protect the environment. In a democracy the will of the state is supposed
to reflect the will of the people. Therefore citizens must push their elected
officials to protect the environment. Otherwise material wealth will be
used for other purposes. In both states citizens have demanded a cleaner
environment Costa Ricans have gotten it while Brazilians have not. The
World Values Survey (WVS) reports that in 2005 60 percent of
respondents in Latin America favored environmental protection even if it
resulted in slower economic growth8.

Conditions in Costa Rica have

gradually gotten better while conditions in Brazil have gotten worse (see
tables 3.1 and 3.2). In short the fragmented party system in Brazil
coupled with the absence of party discipline has prevented most reform

7 This is gross domestic product divide by total population for the years 1975-2007,
data gathered from World ent Indicators. This is in constant U.S. dollars year 2000.
8 The WVS has not been conducted in Costa Rica, the Latino Barometer ranks
preferences so the question is not applicable, and I could not get access to the Latin
American Public Opinion Project database.
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from emerging. In addition the clientelistic nature of the bureaucracy has
led to ineffective policy. In contrast strong party discipline and an
autonomous bureaucracy have allowed Costa Rica to become one of the
leaders in ecotourism and environmental protection in general.
A Short Environmental History
Brazil has one of the most bio-diverse ecologies in the world.
Within Brazil there are five regions highly sensitive to ecological
disruption. The most obvious is the Amazon rainforest which is the
world’s largest carbon sink. The Littoral and Mata Atlantica along the
coastlines are being degraded by sewage, industrial toxins, trash, and
shipping materials. The most biologically diverse wetlands in the world
are in Alto Paraguai which is contaminated by mercury from gold mining,
hunting, fishing, pollution, fertilizers, and hydroelectric projects. The
Savanna is being rapidly industrialized and as a result the soil is being
degraded. This area contains numerous plant and animal species that
have not been studied, and the Pampas and Matas in the south contain
large areas of grasslands that are being affected by agriculture
expansion, slash and burn policies, and overall desertification (Peritore
1999, 111-112). Brazil has made some attempt at environmental
protection: cattle subsidies have been eliminated, national parks have
emerged, and new agencies have been created. However, the elimination
of subsidies was a requirement of IMF and World Bank loans, national
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parks are financed by foreign states in an attempt to protect the area9,
and the new bureaucracies do not have the resources or autonomy
necessary to enforce regulations.

Table 3.1 Environmental Indicators in Brazil
Year

CO2

PM10

NOX

FOREST

PROTECT

GDP/Capita

MILITARY
SPENDING

1980
1.56
3537.62
1981
1.41
3304.36
1982
1.38
3247.65
1983
1.31
3066.53
1984
1.29
3157.81
1985
1.36
3337.34
1986
1.47
3518.01
1987
1.48
3568.99
1988
1.46
3357.53
3.18
1989
1.47
3353.01
2.35
1990
1.4
40.23 227790
61.47
15.7
3285.51
2.60
1991
1.46 40.72
16.67
3386.97
1.49
1992
1.44 40.96
16.81
3514.59
1.45
1993
1.49 39.74
16.89
3615.29
1.77
1994
1.53 37.54
16.9
3637.93
1.57
1995
1.6
33.23 15030
16.91
3704.59
1.89
1996
1.74 32.14
16.91
3650.79
1.58
1997
1.79
31.5
16.97
3606.13
1.86
1998
1.85 31.41
17.11
3706.91
1.73
1999
1.84 34.07
17.12
3701.93
1.54
2000
1.86 32.76 27160
58.3
17.15
3746.85
1.58
2001
1.88 33.49
18.1
3737.39
1.77
2002
1.82 32.75
18.1
3896.97
1.94
2003
1.72 30.26
18.1
1.51
2004
1.8
28.16
18.1
1.37
2005
25.71 83410
56.46
1.41
Source: All data comes from the World Development Indicators except Protected land
which comes from the United Nations Statistics Division

An irony of this is the Indigenous populations of the area have been evicted from the
land which has made them less sensitive to environmental groups. The eviction was not
anticipated by environmental groups. I was unable to find out if an agreement was
reached which would allow the indigenous to return to the land.
9
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The willingness of foreign entities to assist in environmental
protection has been limited to preventing the destruction of the Amazon
rainforest (Foweraker 2001, 865). Attempts have also been made to
establish protected land areas in conjunction with non-governmental
organizations. These attempts have been fairly successful but they are
largely foreign financed which is indicative of the lack of resources the
Brazilian state is willing to distribute for such projects (Rocha and
Jacobson 1998, 938-939).
An examination of the data in table 3.1 shows the emergence of
democracy has not resulted in an overall improvement of most
environmental indicators; the only exception is PM1010. Nitrous oxide
emissions have continued to increase under the democratic regime,
forest as a percentage of total land has continued to decline, CO2
emissions per capita from 1980-1988 (authoritarian period) compared
with 1988-2004 (democratic period) do not show much variation despite
the transition to democracy. It would be expected that the longer a
democratic regime is in place these indicators would drop with time. This
has not been the case some indicators have gotten worse and CO2 has
not changed. Some pressure for environmental protection comes from
outside the state. For instance, optional eco-labeling has had an effect on
some business sectors. Brazil is particularly susceptible to foreign

PM10 refers to fine suspended particles less than 10 microns in diameter which
enters the respiratory tract and causes severe health problems, main source is from
industrial pollution.
10
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pressure because export industries must meet the environmental
requirements of foreign states which are higher than Brazil’s own (Jha,
Markandya, Vossenaar 1999, 104).
In

1992 Brazil

hosted

the

United Nation’s

Conference on

Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. The hosting
of this conference was evidence, according to Hochstetler and Mumme
(1998), that the New Republic’s view of environmental policy is different
from the authoritarian period (46). Prior to the Rio conference President
Collor de Mello placed great emphasis on environmental protection, going
so far as to appoint Jose Lutzemberger to the post of Environmental
Secretariat despite military objections (Rocha, the Guardian London).
Mello’s concern for the environment is in sharp contrast to his
predecessor Jose Sarney who stated “let pollution come, provided that it
brings industries with it” (Quoted in Feeney 1992).
According to Roberto Guimaraes, a former Minister of the
Environment stated “environmental planning lacks relevance” and “every
public enterprise has a cosmetic and powerless environmental unit that
creates environmental impact statements, which are generally ignored”
(Quoted in Peritore 1999, 123). While environmental protection is a
stated goal of the Brazilian state environmental bureaucracies have been
constructed to create deadlock on the issue (Chapter 6). Peritore has
interviewed an executive in Embrapa who claims Embrapa, which is in
charge of sustainable development policy, was placed under the direction
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of the Ministry of Agriculture to ensure conservation efforts would be
slow

to

emerge

(121).

Government

agencies

thus

work

against

environmental protection ensuring that protection goals will not be met.
Costa Rica is not as bio-diverse nor does it maintain the mineral
resource wealth of Brazil, in fact no state does. However, Costa Rica does
contain an approximated 4 percent of total world terrestrial biodiversity.
Costa Rica, which is roughly the size of West Virginia, has more bird
species than the entire United States. The territory consists of dry forests
in the North West, rainforests in the region Corcovado, and contains
approximately 8,000 species of plants (Steinberg 2001, 50). So while
Costa Rica may not be endowed with the natural beauty of Brazil it more
endowed relative to most states, just not Brazil. Costa Rica has been
among the leading states in the area of ecotourism which has proven a
great incentive to protect its commons. Costa Rica is also home to some
of the most environmentally concerned citizens in Latin America
(Brockett & Gottfried 2002, 8). Environmental degradation was prevalent
in Costa Rica prior to the current democratic regime and has continued.
The environmental movement which began in the 1960s gained influence
as a result of the state’s investment in schools and research.
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Table 3.2: Environmental Indicators in Costa Rica
Year

CO2

PM10

NOX

FOREST

PROTECT

GDP/Capita

MILITARY

1980
1.05
3184.06
1981
0.93
3026.51
1982
0.84
2728.63
1983
0.83
2729.49
1984
0.76
2819.53
1985
0.84
2771.88
1986
0.94
3002.78
1987
0.97
3074.25
1988
1.01
3114.16
…
1989
0.98
3116
…
1990
0.95 45.13 3440
50.22
18.88
3319.65
…
1991
1.05 42.81
20.53
3481.04
…
1992
1.16
45.2
20.83
3558.32
…
1993
1.19 43.24
20.83
3607.72
…
1994
1.54
42.4
20.83
3549.28
…
1995
1.4
41.43 3420
21
3653.38
…
1996
1.33 44.41
21
3862.01
…
1997
1.36 36.82
21
4079.56
…
1998
1.42 37.88
21
4058.88
…
1999
1.44 36.61
21
4015.13
…
2000
1.41 33.72 2910
46.53
21
4048.09
…
2001
1.4
32.73
23.05
4225.31
…
2002
1.38 38.74
23.25
4327.37
…
2003
1.55
41.8
23.25
…
2004
1.51 39.11
23.25
…
2005
36.96 2850
46.83
…
Source: All data comes from the World Development Indicators except Protected land
which comes from the United Nations Statistics Division

The social tranquility of the state led foreign researchers interested
in the tropics to conduct their research within Costa Rica. These
researchers assisted in the establishment of educational facilities,
training staff, and promoted conservation initiatives (Barbosa 2000, 143;
Esposito 2002, 65; Steinberg 2001, 54). Costa Rican’s have a high
literacy rate which has helped build awareness of environmental
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sensitivity. The state has even placed conservation awareness in school
curricula (Martin 2004, 164). In 1969, the General Forestry Directorate
(DGF) was created within the Ministry of Agriculture and placed in
charge of the national parks, establishing protected zones, and
regulating recreational activities on the land. Since that time the state
has created a new autonomous agency to oversee all conservation
projects where the DGF now resides (Brockett & Gottfried 2002, 17).
Separate agencies have prevented the marginalization of environmental
impact statements as has happened in Brazil.
Table 3.2 shows that, for the most part, Costa Rica has lower
pollution levels than Brazil. The two exceptions to this are PM10
emissions and forest area as a percentage of total area. The latter
category is the result of an inability to deforest the land. Brazil has
attempted to convert large areas of the Amazon but it has been too costly
in lives. International attention to this area, coupled with indigenous
demands,

has

prevented

deforestation.

Second,

high

rates

of

deforestation in the Amazon and Atlantic forests could result in parity
between the two soon. A closer look at this indicator shows that in 1990
Brazil maintained 61.47 percent of its forest area. This dropped to 58.3
percent in 2000 and to 56.46 percent in 2005. This compares to Costa
Rica which had 50.22 percent in 1990 dropped to 46.53 percent in 2000
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and rose in 2005 to 46.83 percent.11 This shows that deforestation rates
in Costa Rica have tapered off in recent years but have continued to rise
in Brazil. The data show that Costa Rica currently has less forest area
than Brazil but that could change in the coming decades. PM10 levels
have dropped much more rapidly in Brazil than in Costa Rica which
shows that given proper incentives Brazil can enact change.
Another effort to protect the environment in Costa Rica has been
investment in alternative energy sources (Martin 2004, 162; SanchezAzofeifa et al 2002, 410). Deadlines and goals have been set to decrease
the state’s dependence on fossil fuels and move toward hydrogen power.
The state is engaged in the Kyoto Protocol’s “carbon trading” program
whereby a reduction in one state’s emissions can be bought by another
state. The money earned from the program has been used to compensate
individuals who have lost land as a result of protection zones and to fund
sustainable forestry (Borges-Mendez 2008, 373). Costa Rica has been
more willing to engage in international assistance programs than Brazil.
A prime example is debt for nature swaps. Brazil has refused to engage
in such programs labeling them as imperialism whereas Costa Rica has
embraced the proposal (Barbosa 2000, 143). Costa Rica has also been
one of the leading developing states in joint implementation initiatives
proposed

by

the

United

Nations.

This

program

assists

in

the

implementation of conservation projects which involve the state, foreign
Albeit this rise could likely fall within the margins of error which I was not able to
find in World Development Indicators database.

11
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states, multi-national companies (MNCs), and environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs). An example of joint initiatives is
the ENGO Foundation for the Development of the Central Volcanic Range
(FUNDECOR). The creation of this ENGO was sponsored by the state but
was never under state supervision. The organization has fostered
relationships between land squatters, private businesses, and public
agencies instructing each as to the proper maintenance of the land.
FUNDECOR has helped inform people how land preservation can
generate money. Among the programs started by FUNDECOR are
certification of “green” wood, the wood futures market, timber auctioning,
and carbon trading schemes. Other strictly preventive assistance has
been showing companies how to preserve watersheds, and minimize soil
pollutants and waste (Borges-Mendez 2008, 376). Costa Rica has been at
the forefront of innovative policy initiatives such as payments for
environmental services where the state pays firms and/or individuals to
incorporate conservation efforts in their business practices (Pagiola
2002).
Barbosa (2000) attributes Costa Rica’s conservation efforts to its
longevity as a democracy and Brazil’s unsuccessful conservation efforts
to being an infant democracy (141). This overlooks the ability of each
state to protect the environment. Costa Rica’s political institutions are
more amenable to reform and the bureaucracy more effective at policy
implementation. Most conservation efforts have problems. The important
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difference is the ability to learn from mistakes and correct errors. For
this reason environmental protection is more guaranteed with a political
system amenable to reform. The political structure of Costa Rica allows
for reform whereas Brazil’s institutions are not receptive to change.
Political Institutions
The Executive
The Brazilian executive was intentionally made weak under the
1988 constitution and the Costa Rican president weakened under the
1949 constitution (Meade 2003; Booth 1998). This was done to prevent
too much power concentrated in the hands of a single individual. Both
have a history of an executive gaining too much control over state
resources which led to political conflicts. Formal powers aside the, Costa
Rican and Brazilian executive have become stronger relative to the
legislature in recent decades as a result of informal powers.
The executives in both have become stronger in recent decades as
a result of being the source of policy initiation. The fragmented party
system (discussed further below) has hampered the ability of the
Brazilian legislature to formulate policy whereas the constitutional ban
on immediate re-election for legislators in Costa Rica limits sustained
policy expertise in the legislature. Mainwaring (1997) identifies three
types of powers delegated to the Brazilian executive: reactive legislative
powers, proactive legislative powers, and the ability to shape the
legislative agenda (60). Reactive powers allow presidents to veto or
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partially veto legislation, but given the relatively minimal amount of
legislation passed by Congress it matters little. Proactive powers refer to
the ability of presidents to govern by decree. This allows any presidential
decree to have the force of law for 30 days, unless Congress acts.
Environmental

protection

requires

expert

policy

making,

diligent

attention, consistent policy, and sufficient material resources which is
unattainable under a 30 day presidential decree.
The executive in Costa Rica has similar powers but has not had to
rely on them. Like Brazil, much policy begins with the executive. Unlike
the Brazilian president, the Costa Rican president can introduce
legislation without sponsorship. The shift in power to the Costa Rican
executive has been aptly described by Booth as “the executive not only
carries out the law but increasingly makes it as the assembly retreats
from key policy areas” (1998, 63).
This is not to say the executive is unchecked. If a legislator or a
cabinet member objects to an action or piece of legislation, the Supreme
Court of Justice may immediately review the situation and overturn it.
No damage to persons or property is necessary to provoke a review.
Another restriction on the executive is the quasi autonomous nature of
his cabinet. In order for the executive to veto a piece of legislation he
needs the support of the cabinet member in charge of the legislation
affected, which may not be forthcoming. Furthermore, cabinet members
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are the individuals with the greatest expertise and may serve an
indefinite period of time, and as a result are not easily discarded.
An important informal power of the executive in Costa Rica is the
role of party leader.

This derives from the centralized nature of the

political system. This allows the executive to have much control over
state resources and high level positions in the bureaucracy. Brazil has a
federal system but the regional governors act as party leaders for their
region. Governors in Brazil control nominations, alliances, and the
resources needed for election (Samuels 2000, 16). For this reason
legislators in Brazil heed the demands of regional governors over the
executive. For this reason greater concern is given to regional loyalties
and issues.
The executive in Costa Rica has what Cox and Morgenstern (2001)
call a “workable” environment; this is when the government is split
between parties but both are willing to negotiate and compromise over
policy. The executive has some authority over the legislature in terms of
financing, but no control over the legislative agenda (Aleman 2006).
When a majority is not in place, the executive still has the support of his
party members who are able to place issues on the agenda. In contrast to
Brazil the Costa Rican executive maintains control over his party.
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The Legislature
The relationship between the executive and the legislature is of
great importance as well. Cox and Morgenstern (2002) identify four types
of legislatures. Only two are important for this analysis. Brazil would be
considered a “recalcitrant” majority and Costa Rica would be considered
a “workable” majority (173). Brazilian presidents have rarely maintained
a legislative majority and have had to cope with a legislature unbeholden to anyone. In Costa Rica there are two main parties which
compete and as a result are more cooperative. A clear example of the
suitability of the aforementioned titles is the dependence of executives on
their unilateral powers. The Brazilian executive has had to rely chiefly
upon his decree making authority (which expires in 30 days) while the
Costa Rican executive has not resorted to unilateral powers. For this
reason the Costa Rican executive creates policy with the preferences of
opposition candidates in mind and drafts policies with the intent of
legislative reaction.
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) claim political parties “put order into
what would otherwise be a cacophony of dissonant conflicts” (3). Most
scholars agree that parties are useful for the consolidation of democracy.
Parties aggregate social interests, regularize the political process, and
serve as an institution for compromise and representation; Brazilian
parties have not served these functions though (Desposato 2006, 62).
Brazil is a classic example of what Karl (1990) calls a “transition from
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above.” The Brazilian transition took place with no economic crisis,
political opposition, or military defeat. Rather the military began
liberalization as a way to control the political system that would emerge
(Stepan 1989, ix). A clear example of the military’s attempt to keep the
transition under their control is the dismemberment of the opposition
party into numerous weaker parties (Skidmore 1989, 22). This in effect
weakened the opposition and strengthened the party favored by the
military. This has had deleterious effects for the new democracy. The
Brazilian military, with the support of President Sarney, ensured that a
presidential system would emerge. This was done to guarantee Sarney’s
continued powers which he would use to protect the military (Linz and
Stepan 1996, 169). The legislature has many powers associated with a
parliamentary system and as a result has led to gridlock in the legislative
process. The current political system was further embedded in the 1988
constitution which maintained the pre-existing electoral structure of
open-list proportional representation. This procedure weakens the party
and strengthens the individual. Parties are further weakened by electoral
laws. Laws require parties to place an incumbent on their ticket
regardless of party discipline (Ames 1999, 141). These factors have led to
fragmented parties. Power and Roberts (1995) have argued that the
electoral process has proven too confusing for the average voter.
Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (1997) have shown that Brazil lacks party
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discipline which prevents coalitions from forming and places the
consolidation of Brazilian democracy in question.
For instance WVS data show the public want increased civilian
spending as opposed to military spending but this occurs only
sporadically (Lebovic 2001, 450) possibly as a result of political pacts
agreed to during the transitional phase (Karl 1990). Mainwaring (1992)
points to four factors which have prevented strong parties from emerging.
First, income inequality and lack of information has prevented informed
voting. Second, regulatory power is concentrated within the bureaucracy.
Third, the combination of a weak presidency and undisciplined parties
has led to legislative gridlock. Finally, the Brazilian political class has
opted for weak parties (678). In Brazil a major problem is that the state
controls the parties by controlling party affiliation, voting behavior of
representatives, and most importantly by ensuring or denying access to
jobs, resources, promotions, and favors (ibid, 681). This grants state
officials leverage over legislators which in turn leads to compromised
politicians. Ames (1999) goes on to say that political institutions create
incentives that weaken parties and encourage politicians to enrich
themselves or to focus on pork barrel legislation (131). Desposato (2006)
shows that Brazilian legislators switch parties to maximize pork barreling
and short term electoral concerns. The segmentalist organization of
Brazilian society also hinders the importance of political parties (Weyland
1996, 44). This occurs because lobby groups direct resources to
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bureaucrats and can bypass parties to achieve their goals. This is
possible because once appointed bureaucrats no longer have allegiance
to the individual that placed them in power. This is in contradiction of
Geddes’ requirement that bureaucracies must be held accountable. The
inability to remove bureaucrats weakens the ability of the state to
function properly.
The disillusionment of the populace with regards to political
parties is apparent in the WVS of 2005. Twenty percent of respondents
claim they have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the parties.
In short, the citizenry is aware that parties do not represent their interest
which partly explains low political participation throughout the country.
Mainwaring concludes that most politicians see parties “as vehicles for
getting elected, not as organizations to which they owe an attachment”
(688). It is the continued weakness of parties that has allowed business
associations to maintain their control of policy making and enforcement.
Mainwaring and Scully (2008) put forth four characteristics of effective
political parties: stable party competition, voter attachment to parties,
party legitimacy, and party solidarity (119). It is clear that Brazil achieves
none of these characteristics. When parties are weak it enables the
traditional elite to “capture” the policy making process. The party system
has caused several problems even for self-proclaimed environmentalists.
In 1982, three environmentalists were elected to state and local office but
soon came into conflict with the environmental groups that got them
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elected because they had to comprise on issues (Hochstetler and Mumme
1998, 49).
The Costa Rican legislature is more straightforward. In short,
political parties matter and party discipline is adhered to. This makes it
easier to legislate and react quickly to potential problems. Since Costa
Rican independence there have been two factions in social life – the
conservatives and the liberals. The two national parties are the National
Liberation Party (PLN) and Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) which
have been dominant since democracy re-emerged. The 1949 Costa Rican
constitution does not allow immediate re-election of legislators and
provides for proportional representation which should undermine the
strength of political parties. However, parties have maintained influence
over legislators because, unlike Brazil, voters vote for the party not the
individual.12 This demonstrates the importance of party platform. Parties
have been able to maintain influence over legislators because most
legislators want re-election or a post in the president’s cabinet (Taylor
1992). In a survey of Costa Rican legislators Taylor (1992) found that the
second most important part of a legislators’ job is to perform
constituency service on behalf of the party (1061). In Costa Rica a
cabinet position is considered a promotion and is highly desirable. A
second incentive to adhere to party discipline is appointment to the

This is not the case for the executive though. Party preference only matters to the
legislature. When polled voters claim executive ideology and personality were more
important than party allegiance. See Booth 1998, 70.
12
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standing committees. The most important is the finance committee
which makes it easier for legislators to deliver pork to their district. This
committee is wholly dominated by the party in power and access is only
granted to individuals who adhere to party principles. Again, unlike
Brazil, parties are capable evicting individuals from their party, which
effectively retires that person from politics (Carey 2003, 200).
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal subsidizes the costs for elections
in Costa Rica. This allows legislators to be independent of regional
governors and pursue the interests of society as a whole. This is in sharp
contrast with Brazil where legislators are loyal to regional governors, not
the national party. This is not the case in Costa Rica. The national
committee, or the executive, maintains control over national electoral
resources. Reimbursement regulations also ensure that national parties
continue in power. To be reimbursed a party must win at least 5 percent
of the national vote. This subsidy allows equal footing between the two
parties because neither party becomes beholden to special interest
groups.
The differences between party discipline in Brazil and Costa Rica is
what has led to the differences in policy output. Party discipline is nonexistent in Brazil which is why little gets accomplished. Party discipline
is

strong

in

Costa

Rica

which

makes

the

policy

process

and

implementation of policy more efficient. The multitude of parties in Brazil
has led to party labels having little significance.
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The Bureaucracy
Another important distinction is the bureaucratic recruitment
systems. Costa Rica has been more effective at enacting policy while
Brazil has made little progress in enacting reform (Meade 2003; Weyland
1996). Geddes (1990) identifies three prerequisites for good state
bureaucracy: expertise, efficient concentration of scarce resources
(funding), and a bureaucracy committed to achieve its goals (218).
When speaking of efficiency the reference is to “state capacity”
which is the ability of states to “have the capacity, in terms of
organizational cohesion, expertise, and extractive and coercive ability, to
carry out decisions based on their preferences” (Geddes 1990, 217). State
capacity varies among nations. The economically developed West has
much greater capacity than states in the global South. The reasons for
lack of state capacity vary. Among the reasons is a lack of information,
experienced delegates, and/or technical experts (Chasek 2001). State
capacity will also affect how representative a state will be. Without
capacity states will be unable to respond to citizen demands. For this
reason a measure of state capacity can also serve as a proxy of
representativeness.
Weyland (1996) identifies three forms of organization: personalism,
segmentalism, and universalism (32-37). Universalism is typified by a
bureaucracy that puts the interests of the state before its own and views
the entire citizenry as its constituency. Segmentalism is when the
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bureaucracy responds to a narrow group and its demands. The final
category is personalism, or clientelism, whereby bureaucrats sell their
services to the highest bidder. The latter two pose problems for collective
action. Environmental projects are particularly susceptible. These
projects depend on few people relative to labor movements. The clientelist
category typifies Brazil. Ames claims Brazil has the “worst” civil service of
any state in Latin America (1999, 132). Costa Rica will be shown to be
universalist.
Brazil has a federal system which delegates environmental powers
to the local, state, and national level. Policy making power is within the
realm of bureaucracies not centralized (Back and Hadenius 2008).
National resources, principally funding, are not in the hands of the
executive. Rather, it lies within congress which is fragmented, again
contrary to what is prescribed. As a result of income inequality the public
is generally ill informed and easily misled. Participation is limited to the
election of officials most of which the public has no confidence (WVS
2005). Grassroots organizations lack the material resources to petition
the state so they become co-opted to ensure regulations are enforced,
unintentionally becoming subordinate to state demands (Foweraker
2001, 850). Brazil lacks state capacity because the executive is weak and
cannot enforce regulations, Congress is weak because it is highly
fractionalized as a result of multiple parties, no party discipline, and the
bureaucracy has traditionally been clientelistic oriented. Brazil does not
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have the ability to create and enforce environmental reform principally as
a result of the large amount of powers delegated to the legislature and
the fragmented party system. The legislature prevents the executive from
pursuing an agenda. The legislature is unable or unwilling to keep the
bureaucracy from lining its pockets and is incapable of passing
meaningful legislation.
An important part of Geddes (1990) and Chasek (2001) is an
autonomous

and

expert

bureaucracy

making

informed

decisions.

However, across Latin America, especially Brazil, the main influence
political parties have is the appointment of bureaucrats and policy
makers (Mainwaring 1992, 684). Appointments, however, are not based
on merit. They are the result of political necessity. Reid et al (2006)
examines the role of bureaucrats in regulating fisheries in Brazil. They
conclude that most of the agencies lack qualified personnel and many
bureaucracies are in charge of regulating the same problem, but have
different agendas (Reid et al 2006, 271). What further hinders state
capacity is the Brazilian constitution grants life tenure to bureaucrats
(Ames 1999, 132). Referring to Geddes’ three requisites of state capacity:
expertise, sufficient resources, and bureaucrats performing to keep their
job; it is noticeable that none are met in Brazil. This feature has been
present since the beginning of Brazilian democracy. Guimaraes (2002)
goes so far as to say that “civil service” in Brazil means “to serve one’s
own interest,” not the public (233).
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President Sarney, the first president13 of the new republic, was
forced to respond to traditional clientelistic demands (Mainwaring 1986,
173). The claim by Weyland (1996) that “organizational fragmentation”
prevents economic reform equally applies to environmental reform (4).
The close connection between state agencies and business groups;
coupled with the fragmentation of society gives the bureaucracy a certain
degree of autonomy which precludes environmental protection reforms
from emerging. In short, even though a move to democracy has taken
place, the institutional structure of the Brazilian state has not changed
much (Mainwaring 1986).
The Costa Rican bureaucracy has constitutional guarantees for its
funding while in Brazil the budget is in constant flux (Booth 1998, 64).
This restricts the ability of Brazilian bureaucrats to make long term
plans. The guarantee of funding is fundamental for environmental
protection. Conservation efforts require long term investment and
oversight which is difficult to achieve with funding variation.
It has also been shown that meritocratic recruitment, one of the
most important prerequisites for state capacity, has been met in Costa
Rica and not in Brazil14 (Panizza 2001). In Brazil, the executive makes
appointments to those who will provide him support in the legislature.

13 Jose Sarney was the first president of the new republic. However, he was not elected
he assumed office with the unexpected death of Tancredo Neves the directly elected
president, Jose Sarney was the Vice Presidential candidate.
14 This is the process whereby applicants for a position are hired based on their
qualifications not as a result of who they know.
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This means giving jobs to people who are not necessarily qualified. The
Costa Rican executive can appoint and remove ministers from their post
without legislative approval but the expertise of these officials along with
the short time of the executive has made removal a rarely used option.
Furthermore, appointment of these officials is staggered and overlaps
executive administrations (Hughes & Mijeski 1984, 90-91). This means
the executive does not get the administration of his choice rather he
inherits an administration and modifies it with time. This allows for a
diversity of views and a continuation of policy from one administration to
the next.
Autonomy is essential to protect bureaucrats from undue political
interference in policy implementation. For this reason Costa Rica has
nearly 200 autonomous administrative agencies which increase capacity
and protects bureaucrats from political manipulation (Booth 1998, 400).
Rosenburg (1984) has noted that corruption within the social security
bureaucracy has not been tolerated (120). Rather emphasis has been
given to gaining legitimacy from the public so expertise has been an
overriding concern in Costa Rica. This would clearly place Costa Rica
within Weyland’s “universalist” category (1996). The preceding would
make it seem that the Costa Rican bureaucracy can be easily influenced
by elites for they have too much autonomy thus violating one of Geddes’
(1990) prerequisites of a bureaucracy subject to removal for poor
performance. This has not been the case for three reasons. First, the

56

budget is still within the purview of the legislature. The legislature
cannot reduce funds but can choose to not increase funds for other
projects.

Second,

performance

has

been

rewarded

within

the

bureaucracy via promotions and amenities. Lastly, pay within the public
sector has been higher than that in the private sector which helps to
keep bureaucrats loyal to the state (Panizza 2001, 143).
Civil Society
Civil society in Brazil is weak as a result of an inability to build
strong coalitions and effectively pressure the state (Encarnacion 2003).
However, the weakness of civil society is a result of the institutions in
place. Civil society organizations are well financed and organized but the
fragmented system in place prevents effective pressure.
It is expected that civil society groups provide an alternative to
political parties to have their interests represented (Diamond 1994, 8).
However, as a result of political patronage in the bureaucracy and severe
economic inequality the bureaucracy is not responsive to civil society
groups. Civil society groups have lacked discipline and connections to
political parties to be effective at pushing an environmental agenda
(Foweraker 2001, 850). The fragmented party system makes it difficult to
rally legislatures to a particular cause and the lack of party discipline
forces civil society to appeal to a wide range of individuals. Certain civil
society groups do benefit from the fragmented system by following the
clientelistic actions of business associations (Encarnacion 2003, 129).
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This has, however, resulted in the lack of cohesion among civil society
groups and results in free riders, lack of collective action, and mistrust
(ibid, 129). Political patronage prevents bureaucrats from being removed
from office especially since most appointments are made by individual
congressional members not the party (Mainwaring 1992, 684). Diamond
is correct in pointing to the benefits that civil society can provide, but the
importance of political parties which do engage in the political process is
superior to civil society (Mainwaring 1999, 332). Another problem is
environmental policy is highly technical, requires expertise, and needs
financial resources which many grassroots groups do

not have

(Hochstetler and Mumme 1998, 38). It could be claimed that people are
more interested in economic development as opposed to environmental
protection. However, Jacobs (2002) effectively shows that despite
widespread poverty there is no significant difference between Brazil and
European states with regards to environmental issues. In the study
Jacobs compares group participation in environmental cleanup projects
and awareness, as measured by the Euro barometer and Latino
barometer, and finds no significant difference.
Environmental groups are the civil society of most importance to
this study, but while environmentalist have a long history in Brazil they
have not been effective. Environmental movements are typically seen as
unified and homogenous which may not be true. In Brazil environmental
groups in the various regions differ on strategies and concession making
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(Hochstetler 1997, 204). It is reported by Hochstetler that international
environmental groups have had difficulty finding partners in the Amazon
because environmental groups are fragmented and not cohesive (214). As
a result they have had to seek support from the Rubber Tappers and
union leaders in the region. This is especially true for protection of the
Amazon. Foreign environmental groups worked with Chico Mendes’
movement to prevent the encroachment of ranchers into the forests.
Mendes’ movement has been used as a model but it neglects the
contextual factors that made the movement a relative success. Keck
(1995) points to the murder of Chico Mendes and the salience of
environmental protection at the time as factors which were influential.
These factors may not be present for other movements (420). Civil society
groups have not had much influence because resources are highly
concentrated in the state bureaucracy, which is inaccessible to most
environmental groups (Guimaras 2002, 231-232).
Costa Rica has an institutional structure more open to pressure
from civil society groups. The party system and party discipline have
made it easier to pressure legislators. Like Brazil, much of the money
that sustains these organizations comes from foreign donors. These
donors are only interested in protecting the rainforest, as is the case with
Brazil. Localized air pollution and improving urban waste management
has not been of importance to foreign donors (Quiros 2003, 135). ENGOs
have traditionally worked with the state to get environmental projects
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underway and provide oversight to ensure policies enacted are effective
(Tahkokallio & Nygren 2008, 348). Like Brazilian groups, Costa Rican
environmentalists have sought the assistance and cooperation of those
affected by environmental policy. A defining feature of these groups,
compared to Brazilian groups, is their aversion to engaging in politics
(ibid 2008, 347; Steinberg 2001 84-86). The reluctance of ENGOs to
engage in the political process has restricted their concerns to
international issues which neglects pollution that adversely affects the
local population.
Civil society groups have been much more effective in Costa Rica
than in Brazil. The emphases of both have been on international
concerns not of the local population. This has restricted their ability to
gain the loyalty of the local population. All the same, civil society groups
do provide an invaluable function that Payne (1995) and Diamond (1994)
predict. The theoretical fault of Payne and Diamond come from not
examining the institutions in which actors must engage. Brazil does not
maintain institutions open to change nor are they easily accessible.
Costa Rica has an open system which is why civil society groups have
been more effective. For this reason the institutional setting is of superior
importance than the strength of civil society.
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Conclusions
An important distinction between the two states is the absence of a
military in Costa Rica. Military expenditures average 1.9 percent of GDP
across Latin America15. This allows Costa Rica to invest in social projects
whereas Brazil continues to spend large sums for national security.
Costa Rica has degraded its environment and had one of the highest
deforestation rates in the world (Pagiola 2002, 38). However, the state
has been remedying the negative externalities of economic development.
Costa Rica has been able to learn from its experiences at environmental
reform and adjust accordingly; while Brazil maintains a deeply
entrenched system which is not amenable to reform. The fragmented
party system in Brazil has hurt all efforts at environmental reform. This
is in contrast to the strong federal system in place in Costa Rica. Costa
Rica also maintains an independent meritocratic based bureaucracy
which serves the interest of the nation as a whole. The opposite is true of
the Brazilian bureaucracy, which is headed by patronage appointments
and a dearth of expertise in environmental management.
Environmental protection in Costa Rica can easily be attributed to
the revenue generating industry ecotourism. This, however, would
neglect the decade’s long movement toward environmental protection
which preceded the emergence of this industry. It was not until the mid
1980s when ecotourism became a success in Costa Rica (Steinberg 2001,

15

Brazil averages 1.8 percent of gross domestic product
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76). This was four decades after the roots of environmental protection
had been planted and two decades after it began to receive international
recognition for its efforts.
In summary, the term democracy is a contested concept. The term
can more easily be understood when making the distinction between
procedural democracy and representative democracy. The former has
democratically elected officials and the rule of law prevails. However, the
system itself fails to reflect the interests of the masses they represent.
The latter maintains democratically elected officials, the rule of law, and
reflects the interests of the masses. When democratic theorists declare
the benefits of democracy the distinction should be made between
procedural and representative democracy. Brazil falls under the category
of

procedural

democracy

and

Costa

Rica

under

representative

democracy. A transition to procedural democracy can occur without a
transfer of power away from the traditional governing class.
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CHAPTER 4

CHILE AND GUATEMALA
As has been argued there are two necessities for environmental
protection: 1) the resources and 2) the desire to protect the environment.
Chile’s institutional structure strengthens the executive and minimizes
the ability of the legislature to heed the demands of civil society which
results in lackluster environmental performance. While Chile does
protect the environment more so than Brazil it does so simply to ensure
good relations with its trading partners in the event of a free trade pact
requiring such protection. It will be shown that because the legislature is
not an avenue to petition for environmental protection the only recourse
is the executive. The executive maintains control over the state
bureaucracy and the budget. It is the prerogative of the executive to
enforce the law; if he chooses to ignore the environment there is little
that can be done to compel enforcement. State capacity is not lacking in
Chile. The staff and resources are available but the limited desire to
protect the environment has led to half-hearted policies.
As of 2003 Chile was still considered by some to be in a
transitional phase (Aguero 2003). Garreton (2000) claims Chile is a
consolidated semi-democracy but not many observers suggest Chile is a
full fledged democracy. Among the reasons for this are the constraints
imposed upon the current regime as a result of the drafting of the
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constitution prior to the demise of the dictator Augusto Pinochet. The
military is allowed to appoint nine senators who can prevent the
legislature from overriding executive vetoes. The Chilean president is
debatably the most powerful of all executives in Latin America. The
disproportionate power granted to the executive is the result of
manipulations by Pinochet who thought he would be elected to the
presidency (Siavelis 1997). However, this study begins with the
assumption that Chile is a democracy for all indices categorize Chile as a
democracy

since

1990.

However,

the

limitations

that

Garreton

emphasizes have restricted the ability of the state to perform many
functions so the ability of the state to represent the will of the people is
questionable. President Lagos (2000-2006) outlined seven “great reforms”
that would modernize the country none had any provisions for
environmental protection (Aguero 2003, 318). During the authoritarian
rule

of

Pinochet

most

avenues

of

expression

were

silenced.

Environmental concerns were not among those silenced as a result the
environmental movement garnered support among a diverse populace,
but this community died when it no longer had a common cause (Silva
1996, 9; Carruthers 2001, 345). Carruthers (2001) points to the
movement fading as the result of lackluster gains in environmental
protection. He claims the end of dictatorship has resulted in the
departure of environmental experts to positions within the state. This,
however, is a good thing for it is experts that are needed to make
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informed policy decisions. An examination of the influence of experts in
the policy process is of more importance. The problem hurting Chilean
environmental policy is the asymmetrical nature of the policy process.
The executive yields many powers typically reserved for the legislature
and maintains a significantly larger staff than does the legislature as a
whole. This allows the executive to be more informed and draft legislation
that tends to the needs of a particular sector. This reduces the number of
avenues available to ENGOs can attempt to influence policy.
Guatemala is among the poorest states in Latin America hence
state capacity is immediately questionable. The average per capita
income for the time period under consideration is USD 1,568; far less
than the average for Chile USD 3,652. In addition, income distribution is
much less skewed in Chile than in Guatemala. These two factors would
lead us to believe that Chilean demands for environmental protection
would be greater than in Guatemala. Guatemalans responding to the
Latino Barometer consistently placed environmental protection ahead of
economic development with a low of 52 percent in 1996 and a high of 66
percent in 1997. Chileans also favored environmental protection over
economic development with a low of 66 percent in 1995 and a high of 80
percent in 1996. In addition Guatemalans, unlike Chileans, were willing
to be taxed to pay for environmental protection (63 percent in favor);
whereas only 22 percent of Chileans were willing to pay the necessary
taxes. It is interesting that Guatemalans prefer environmental protection
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to economic growth due to the lack of material wealth for most persons.
Guatemala makes an interesting case because it is not categorized as a
democracy by most indices; rather it is considered semi-democratic at
best. In contrast to Chile, the people of Guatemala favor environmental
protection on roughly equal terms, but Guatemalans are willing to pay
for such protection (despite the higher poverty rate in Guatemala), but
Guatemala is not a democracy. This allows us to compare a democratic
state with the capacity but not the will to protect the environment (Chile)
with a non-democratic state that has the will but not the capacity to do
so (Guatemala).
The political system in place, similar to Chile, is the result of a pact
between the military and representatives of the civilian population. The
transition to democracy technically occurred in 1985 with the election of
Vinicio Cerezo. However, the limitations placed upon the regime and the
constant threat of military intervention restrained the governance of
elected officials. Despite winning by a wide margin and U.S. support for
his regime, the Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo did very little to
change the priorities of the state (Jonas 1995, 30). This meant
continuing the civil war which included the continued oppression of the
Mayans (who incidentally account for at least 50 percent of the
population) and the continued rule of the traditional elite. The transition
to democracy did not mean a transfer of power. Instead, the transition
involved the continuation of the military regime with a civilian president
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(Jonas 1995, 29). All of this meant the environment along with all other
social issues were a non factor. In fact the military leaders warned
against any major reform efforts (Williams and Seri 2003, 321). In
addition, the ability of political parties to participate in the electoral
process was greatly restricted (Jonas 2001, 62).
The military which ruled from 1954-1985 formally cannot be
labeled efficient simply because its only prerogative was to quell any
social unrest. The instability of the post Arbenz state is chronicled by
Granados (1992) who states “one president was assassinated, two
interim presidents were named, five government juntas were formed, one
election was annulled, one presidential election was repeated, and one
president elected through the mechanism of a coup d’etat was deposed
(92).” This has continued with the semi-democratic state of today. The
powers of each branch have been contested, stalemates have occurred,
and the implementation of laws have been selective (Macias 1996, 147).
Congress has been marked by vote buying and an executive which is
corrupt. Guatemala has been cited by Transparency International as the
third most corrupt state in all of Latin America (cited in Canache and
Allison 2005, table 1). In short, all branches of the state are inefficient
just as they were under authoritarian rule. In fact human rights
violations are thought to have become worse under a pseudo-democratic
regime (Trudeau 1993, 125). Military prerogatives remain supreme and
any policy efforts which differ from its interests will not pass and will not
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be enforced. This leads the evaluation of each branch of the Guatemalan
state to focus on the restrictions placed upon it by the military.
A Short Environmental History
Chile has taken a market-friendly approach to environmental
protection. This approach has not incorporated grassroots projects like
that in Costa Rica (Silva 1997, 458). As a result conflict has been high
over environmental policy because the indigenous populace has not been
willing to go along with state programs. Indeed the relationship between
indigenous groups and foreign conservationists, these are people who
purchase land with no intent of using it, has been tenuous at best (Meza
2009). Environmental protection has not been high on the priority list for
the Chilean state yet it has been a concern for the Chilean people.
Responding to polls from Latino Barometer for the years 1995-1998 a
majority of people favored environmental protection at the expense of
slower growth. The lowest number in favor of the environment was 57
percent in 1998 with a high of 80 percent in 1996. This is in large part a
result of the economic success of the state. This success however has
come at the expense of the environment which has been the development
path followed for decades. Under the Pinochet regime the state followed a
policy of resource led development. This policy has continued under the
democratic regime with little change (Clapp 1998). Treasury Secretary
Alejandro Foxley attributed Chile’s continued economic success to its
resource

endowments

and

reflects
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the

overall

sentiment

that

diversification of the economy is not necessary; rather expansion of
resource exploitation is (cited in Clapp 1998, 4). Much of Chile’s
environmental problems arise from the demand on the environment. The
fishing industry, forestry sector, mining, and the agricultural sector all
boomed under authoritarian rule and this success has continued
unabated. The consequent effects are an urban environment, water
pollution, biodiversity is threatened, and over fishing is threatening
salmon in the region (Silva 1996, 7). The development policy Chile has
followed has relied on resources which have little or no value added. The
industries have not required much human capital despite the state’s
willingness to finance worker education programs. The industry and the
state have ignored those who advocate moving toward products with
higher-value added content, but stalemate has been reached as a result
of the ideological commitment which prevails (Weyland 1999, 75).
Attempts at environmental protection in Chile include the use of
tree farming. This is a process whereby farmers plant non-native trees for
export. This has led to a reduction in the deforestation of native species
but the sustainability of the project is questionable. Clapp (2001) puts
forth four requisites for sustainable forestry and Chile does not meet one
of the requisites. The missing requirement is for managed forests lead to
a reduction in demand for traditional markets. This has not occurred
because the harvesting of native plant species is controlled by small
farmers who do not have the resources necessary to engage in
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sustainable forestry. Another reason for the failure of this program is the
inability to know the exact conditions for successful forestry projects.
The local farmers do not have the necessary capital to fund the research
and the state is unwilling to expend the resources to make sustainable
forestry feasible (Silva 1997, 468). Chile has also received praise for its
“reduction” of PM10 emissions and CO2 emissions (Gunther et al 2002)16.
This was another market based approach which sought to provide the
proper incentives to polluting firms to voluntarily reduce emissions.
There are two problems with this decree the first is a reduction in
emissions is not a guarantee that pollution levels will increase.17 This is
because a cap has not been placed upon emissions. Rather, firms are
granted trading permits for the emissions that they are capable of
emitting not for their actual emissions. A firm does not need to reduce its
emissions in order for it to sell its potential emissions. It can sell
emissions that it may have never reached. Therefore this is not an
efficient way to reduce emissions nor is it a way to maintain emissions at
the current level. Another problem is the potential for rent seeking
behavior within the permit industry. Since caps are not set at the actual
emissions level it is possible for bribery to occur so as to increase the

16 This is contrary to the data used in this study which shows increases in CO2
emissions
17 The emissions trading scheme is not law because it has not passed in the legislature
rather the executive has issued a decree which has the force of law since Congress did
not act upon it. This will be elaborated upon when the powers of the executive are
examined.
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potential emissions to allow for greater trading of emissions that would
not have otherwise occurred.
Environmental policy is not new to Chile as attempts to protect
forests have existed for some time. Prior to the 1973, coup protected
areas were established to protect a slow growing tree, the Alerce species.
This policy continued under Pinochet who declared the species a national
monument and made it illegal to cut any of the trees dead or alive.
However it was permissible to cut fallen trees which made enforcement
difficult because it required someone to be caught in the act of felling the
tree (Clapp 1998, 11). This policy has been extended to other tree species
but the same exception has led to continued logging hence enforcement
has been difficult to achieve. Furthermore, permits are needed to cut
trees but enforcement has been lacking. The organization in charge of
forest clearing is the National Forest Corporation (CONAF). As was the
case with Brazil this group’s two primary mandates contradict each
other. This group has a broad mandate and limited staff a characteristic
all too common in environmental protection agencies. President Eduardo
Frei has gone so far as to say “no environmental cause will stand in the
way of development” (quoted in Clapp 1998, 24). This is opposed to what
the majority of Chileans prefer according to the above cited polls by
Latino Barometer. Despite citizen requests for environmental protection,
Chile has had an unimpressive record. Table 4.1 shows that on most
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Table 4.1: Environmental Indicators for Chile
Year
CO2
NOX
FOREST
PM10
PROTECT
MILITARY
GDP/Capita
1980 2.47
2501.4
1981 2.19
2580.7
1982 1.85
2278.36
1983 1.89
2157.06
1984 1.94
2291.17
1985 1.82
2413.99
1986 1.79
2507.05
1987 1.84
2628.02
1988 2.15
4.94
2772.81
1989 2.57
4.08
3013.13
1990
2.7
8170
20.38
87.88
13.44
4.16
3069.87
1991 2.53
82.04
13.44
3.95
3255.22
1992
2.6
76.5
13.44
3.72
3588.69
1993
2.6
76.28
13.44
3.60
3770.54
1994 2.95
75.38
13.55
3.37
3916.93
1995 3.11
9430
71.26
13.82
3.06
4262.68
1996 3.51
71.98
13.82
3.09
4509.15
1997 3.97
70.14
13.82
3.21
4738.69
1998 3.89
67.97
13.84
3.42
4826.38
1999 4.16
69.78
13.84
3.68
4728.62
2000 3.87 10990
21.15
62.51
13.84
3.70
4880.23
2001 3.55
59.19
13.84
3.71
4985.36
2002 3.64
60.47
13.84
3.81
5036.33
2003 3.61
58.13
20.76
3.41
5176.06
2004 3.87
54.98
20.76
3.80
5426.99
2005
12590
21.53
53.12
3.72
Source: All data comes from the World Development Indicators except Protected land
which comes from the United Nations Statistics Division

indicators environmental conditions have increasingly gotten worse,
PM10 and protect are exceptions. This is despite the reduction in military
spending and increased GDP/Capita. Both indicators would suggest a
move toward more socially oriented programs.
Interestingly enough Chile has renewed efforts to protect the
environment as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). The free trade agreement among the three North American
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states required certain environmental provisions mostly directed at
Mexico. This, however, has shown Chile what conditions a free trade
agreement with the U.S. will be included. For this reason the state has
begun to take the environment more seriously (Silva 1996, 2). This is fine
by the Chilean populace who in 2000 overwhelmingly (86 percent)
supported the incorporation of environmental protection in any free trade
agreement.

It has been shown that the Chilean people want

environmental protection yet the state has been unwilling to expand
environmental programs. Carruthers (2001) attributes the lack of
environmental policy and enforcement on the state’s close ties and
dependency upon the business sectors that profit from lax environmental
regulations. However, another poll by Latino Barometer in 2001 shows
that 77 percent of respondents would not want to pay higher taxes to
protect the environment. It is, therefore, not just the business elite that
do not want their flexibility taken away it is also the masses who do not
want to make the necessary sacrifices to protect the environment. A final
factor leading to the predominance of market-friendly environmental
policies is the fear of military intervention for issues that would appear
leftist (Linz & Stepan 1996, 205). Chile has shown a “bias toward riskaversion in the domain of gains” (Weyland 1999, 89).

In other words

Chile has preferred the certainty of the status quo to the risk of changing
anything within society. This sentiment is accurate of its approach to
environmental protection. There has been continued environmental
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protection but there has been little change in policies from the Pinochet
years. The changes that have occurred prescribe gradual changes only to
sectors that are relatively small relative to the overall economy.
Environmental conditions in Guatemala have steadily gotten worse
since 1980 on all indicators except protected area (see table 4.2). The
ability of the state to protect this area is questionable given the low
taxation rates and the lack of expertise in the bureaucracy to carry out
regulations. Not only is there a dearth of expertise but the ability of the
state to pass, let alone implement, regulations is restricted by military
prerogatives. Deforestation has been a major issue in Guatemala not just
for environmental degradation but also for the displacement of persons
that has occurred as a result. The military followed a “scorched earth”
policy up until 1996 (when the civil war ended) to weaken the guerillas.
This resulted in land use changes and the displacement of people. These
two factors led to an increase in cattle ranching, which further degraded
the soil and the forced migration of indigenous people to the metropolitan
areas which worsened air and water quality in urban areas.
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Table 4.2: Environmental Indicators in Guatemala
Year
CO2
NOX
FOREST PM10
PROTECT MILITARY GDP/Capita
1980
0.64
1684.98
1981
0.55
1654.51
1982
0.49
1556.9
1983
0.42
1479.66
1984
0.44
1451.02
1985
0.44
1407.96
1986
0.45
1377.25
1987
0.48
1393.53
1988
0.48
1.59
1415.13
1989
0.49
1.54
1437.88
1990
0.57
4780
43.79
63.07
25.92
1.47
1449.11
1991
0.55
64.22
25.92
1.08
1468.15
1992
0.64
66.47
25.92
1.25
1504.26
1993
0.59
61.54
25.92
1.08
1527.86
1994
0.7
64.17
25.92
1.08
1553.61
1995
0.72
5060
62.93
29.47
0.99
1593.93
1996
0.65
59.45
30.1
0.82
1604.59
1997
0.73
57.12
30.67
0.74
1637.55
1998
0.82
61.3
30.73
0.72
1681.14
1999
0.81
69.58
30.74
0.68
1706.52
2000
0.91
7090
38.81
77.93
30.76
0.82
1727.56
2001
0.92
77
30.76
1.05
1726.55
2002
0.93
77.12
30.76
0.76
1723.53
2003
0.88
69.13
30.76
0.82
1718.13
2004
0.99
67.36
30.76
0.48
1721.42
2005
7980
36.32
62.23
0.38
Source: All data comes from the World Development Indicators except Protected land
which comes from the United Nations Statistics Division

Unlike

Chile,

conditions

for

foreign

aid

were

not

tied

to

improvements or enforcement of environmental regulations. Rather
USAID was tied to improvements in human rights which assisted in the
transition to democracy in 1985. Guatemala, just like Chile, depended
upon its resource endowments (again at the behest of the U.S.) for its
economic development (Berger 1997, 100; Jonas and Walker 2000, 5).
Throughout the authoritarian period and to the present day the economy
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has been dependent on agricultural products (primarily bananas, sugar,
and coffee). This dependence has led to the unrestricted use of land
which resulted in degraded soil conditions, polluted waters, and
deforestation throughout the country.
Environmentalists in Guatemala are routinely threatened by the
military who objects to protected reserves. The military in addition tells
the locals that environmentalists are attempting to take away their
livelihood by creating protected areas (Berger 1997, 106). This has
resulted

in

tense

relations

between

environmentalists

and

local

residents. Similar to Chile, the environmental movement in Guatemala
did consist of various interests; but, unlike Chile, all social movements
were oppressed and all proposals objectionable to the military labeled
communist (Zarate 1994, 61). The principle objective of the state has
been economic development with little regard for the environment. This is
contrary to public opinion probably because the poorer sectors of the
population know they will not benefit from economic growth.
Still, alleviating poverty in Guatemala must remain the priority of
any governing regime. This necessitates policies that protect the
environment but not at the expense of economic growth. For this reason
most attempts at environmental protection have come from abroad with
acquiescence from the state, not necessarily avid support. There have
been efforts at such programs. The principal effort has been in the form
of promoting ecotourism. State programs often fail simply as a result of
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the indigenous population isolating themselves and disregarding national
regulations. Bascomb and Taylor (2008) advocate ecotourism as a way to
incorporate indigenous demands and national policy into a sustainable
project. This would be done by tying the success of the industry to the
quality of life of the local residents. Bascomb and Taylor examine the
benefits ecotourism has had on the village of Chicacnab in the Central
part of the country and note ecotourism has been beneficial for local
residents. Yet the industry, while not failing, has not thrived. This is a
result of high crime rates and continued social conflict within the state.
The U.S. State Department has consistently issued travel warnings to
Americans traveling in the area. Another issue area has been oil
exploration. Imports of oil account for 10 percent of all imports which is
a heavy burden on the state. As a result when a proposal is offered the
state is eager to accept despite the environmental hazards posed and the
displaced persons it results in (Trudeau 1993, 164).
In regards to deforestation, politicians often hold the view that the
land itself is more valuable than the trees that reside on the land
(Richards & Tucker 1988). The regulation of forests is the responsibility
of the local municipalities. The 1985 constitution requires 8 percent
(increased to 10 percent in 1994) of the national budget be transferred to
the municipalities. However, Guatemala ranks among the least taxing
states in Latin America. This is partially the result of international
lending institutions (FAO 1999) that believe decentralization leads to
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more efficient management. This assumes that the local population and
governing elite will place emphasis on protection of the forests. This has
not been the case in Guatemala. In a survey of Guatemalan mayors
Gibson and Lehoucq (2003) find that protection of the forests is not a
priority for the local governments and when staff is allocated to
protection of the forests it is only to secure federal financing. Guatemala
has been seen as a potential carbon sink to offset carbon emissions. An
independent power agency Applied Energy Service (AES) gave Guatemala
USD 2 million (renewed in 2000) to protect a forest which would offset
the emissions AES produced in Connecticut. However, with enforcement
of forestry protection being shifted to municipal areas reforestation
projects has slowed and an inhospitable population has threatened
reforestation efforts (Wittman & Caron 2009, 715). The protected area
created as a result of AES financing has taken away wood which is the
primary energy source of local communities. Furthermore, Brown and
Delaney (1999) have found that the project has not sequestered the 11
million tons of carbon predicted by AES and the World Resources
Institute (WRI). Rather they conclude around 275 thousand pounds have
been sequestered. This shows the lack of expertise on the ground and the
uncertain nature of such projects. Debt for nature swaps have been
another

international

effort

at

helping

lower

Guatemalan

debt

simultaneously protecting the environment. In one of the largest debt for
nature swaps the United States lowered Guatemala’s debt 20 percent for
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four regions (Ness 2006). The money is expected to support financing of
park rangers and monitoring. Given the lack of attention given to
indigenous groups demands it is unlikely they will be cooperative in
these efforts.
Political Institutions
The Executive
The executive in Chile is among the most powerful in Latin
America. In fact Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) list Chile’s executive as
the most powerful in all of Latin America (table 1.6, p 49). Siavelis (1997)
gives an account of the formal powers the executive has compared to the
legislature. Among the most useful tools at the executive’s disposal is the
ability to issue executive urgencies which must be considered before
anything else by the legislature. This allows the executive to control the
legislative agenda and possibly prevent any other legislation from being
debated. The president can also call the assembly into session. During
these sessions the legislature can only consider proposals initiated by the
executive. Possibly the most important power granted to the executive is
control over the budget. The executive has almost exclusive control over
the budgetary process. The legislature may only reduce or approve the
budget. If neither is done within 60 days the budget goes into affect
without legislative approval. The power of the purse allows the executive
to control the finances of the various agencies. This permits the preferred
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projects of the president to get full consideration and less important
items to be disregarded or neglected entirely.
During the initial period of democracy the environment was low on
the list of priorities. Rather, democratic consolidation, maintaining
economic growth, and human rights issues were of primary interests. By
the second president (Patricio Aylwin) the environment began to gain
some attention; too much as it turned out. The Aylwin presidency was
based on compromise and his coalition was tenuous. He therefore did
not want to offend too many by pushing an agenda supported by a few.
For this reason he took a middle ground position by continuing programs
from the Pinochet era to protect the environment. These were all marketbased approaches which adhered to the tenets of the neo-liberal model.
For this reason the policy of gradualism emerged whereby first priority
would be given to those issues which would generate the least conflict.
None of the regulations imposed on the business sector would be too
onerous and the enforcement agency was made to be more of a
coordinating institution (Silva 1996, 24).
The Guatemalan executive is in charge of appointments to the
bureaucracy. Therefore similar to Chile and Brazil an executive
interested in ecological preservation can strengthen the bureaucracy but
this has yet to be the case. As a result, the marginalization of
environmental issues has continued once again showing the lack of
change from authoritarian rule to a prima facie democracy. The executive
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has been seen as corrupt and nepotistic (Jonas 1995, 33). In 1993, in an
attempt to overcome stalemate between the legislature and the executive
President Serrano (with military support) dissolved Congress and the
Supreme Court. Attempts were made to reduce the size of the legislature
which would make coalition building easier and increase the power of the
executive. However, due to pressure from the U.S. and civil unrest the
military turned against Serrano and ordered his exile. The continued
instability in Guatemala and the central role of the military in the policy
process has inhibited proposals that threaten the landed elite from
coming forth. The corruption that plagued Serrano’s presidency was a
consequence of his inability to get legislation passed. It is estimated he
spent nearly USD 50 million a year on buying votes in the Congress
(Cameron 1998, 134). Aside from Serrano all Guatemalan executives
have had a majority in Congress yet have not been able to fulfill their
campaign promises (Negretto 2006, 73).
Rather than alienate the military, all executives up until 1996
continued the civil war. The continuation of the civil war resulted in the
disregard for all other functions of the state. In addition the lack of party
discipline and the multitude of political parties have led to an executive
unable to build a coalition (Carey 2007, 98). In short the executive is not
independent of the military. The executive serves at the behest of the
military and when attempts are made to become independent the
military has removed that president. Things have changed in recent
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years. The autogolpe attempted by Serrano has actually helped to further
democracy simply because it failed (Cameron 1998). However, the
interests of the military remain the same and social reform has not
occurred. For instance Guatemala’s tax as a percentage of total GDP was
the lowest in Latin America at 6 percent in 1990. However, since 1996
this has increased rapidly and reached 11 percent by 2006. This shows
that there is a move toward greater accountability but the inability of the
legislature to reach a consensus has led to stalemate. In contrast to Chile
the Guatemalan executive is very weak relative to the legislature. The
Chilean executive dominates the legislative agenda, prioritizes issues,
controls the budget, and maintains strict control over his or her party.
The Guatemalan executive has none of these attributes (Aleman 2006,
140). The environment as a result is of secondary interest to an executive
that prioritizes continued economic growth. Secondly, the executive is
more difficult for ENGOs to petition in comparison to individual
legislators. If an executive decides reduce the budget for environmental
programs the legislature can do nothing.
The Legislature
It has already been shown how the executive can control the
legislative agenda. However, it could be argued the legislature can simply
vote down all of the executive’s proposals and move on to concerns of its
own. This would not occur for three reasons. First, if the executive’s
proposals were voted down simply for this reason they could simply be
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proposed again to be heard at the same legislative session. Second,
parties are strong and there are strong incentives to cooperate with the
executive so as to achieve other goals specific to individual legislators
(Carey & Siavelis 2005). Third, the legislature does not have the
resources to carry out the necessary research nor the expertise needed to
formulate good policy.
Political parties are strong in Chile and party discipline is adhered
to in the legislature. There are two main parties in Chile the
Concertacion and the Alliance for Chile. These parties however are
coalitions of parties and therefore represents a diverse and large
populace. The Chilean system has been a multiparty system since
democracy first emerged in 1932, which necessitated coalitions. Such
coalitions, it has been argued, led to the coup of 1973 (Linz and Stepan
1996; Aguero 2003; Scully 1995). The gridlock caused by diverse
interests worked initially but faltered which led to the socialist candidate
Salvador Allende gaining the presidency which in turn led to the coup by
Pinochet. This is part of the reason the legislature was made weak
relative to the executive to avoid such problems again (Baldez & Carey
1999, 30-31). Nevertheless, political parties have resumed their place at
the center of the Chilean political process (Scully 1995, 123).
The legislature is often perceived as the best route for civil society
to pressure the state to achieve its goals. However, in Chile the
legislature is strictly forbidden from proposing legislation which deals
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with “social issues” (Siavelis 1997, 329). This is a result of Pinochet’s
influence over the drafting of the constitution currently in effect. Only the
executive may initiate bills which deal with social issues. This was an
attempt to ensure that no socialist measures were proposed by the
legislature. Pinochet believed he would be elected to the presidency so he
intentionally made the executive stronger relative to the legislature. If
such legislation is proposed two things can occur. First, the legislation
can be declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal. Second,
the legislator who proposed the legislation can be removed from office
(ibid, 329). This restriction on the legislature has had the beneficial affect
of preventing rampant clientelistic behavior. This has however resulted in
the inability of ENGOs to pressure the legislature for reform. Rather all
pressure must be directed at the executive and ministerial level. Neither
of which have been eager to change existing environmental policies.
Another impediment to proper legislation within the legislature is
the lack of staff granted to legislators. This translates into insufficient
expertise on most policy issues. Environmental protection is an area
which requires long term investments and careful planning. The
executive in contrast has access to a large staff and control over the
ministries which are charged with specific tasks. Asymmetric information
grants the executive an informal power which adds to the power of the
office. A problem that arises is the protection of the environment requires
long term policies and enforcement but if an executive comes to office
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and chooses to neglect those policies the legislature has little recourse
because it does not control the budgetary process. The system in place
restrains spending by the legislature and greatly favors the executive
(Baldez & Carey 1999, 34). Environmental protection requires investment
of money, staff, and time none of which are controlled by the legislature.
Another avenue available to reduce the asymmetrical nature of the
policy process is the availability of academics and think tanks to advise
legislators on a pro bono basis (Siavelis 1997, 333). However, when
commissioned by the state to produce a report on the status of the
forests the results were not to the liking of the forestry sector and as a
result the director of the project has been fired and the rest of the
collaborators have faced disciplinary action (Clapp 1998, 30). Such
actions were undertaken by the military regime and continue under the
democratic regime of today. For this reason academics would rather not
undertake such projects out of fear of repercussions. As a result the
congress simply meets with the minister in charge of certain areas so as
to become informed of potential policy proposals and the subsequent
effect (Siavelis 1997, 353.)
Parties are disciplined in Chile but the executive needs a majority
to achieve its stated goals. There are two main parties in Chile which vie
for power and as a result could pose the challenges found in Brazil.
However, with the executive controlling the agenda and the budget it is
incumbent upon legislators of all parties to cooperate with the executive
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to achieve their goals as well. Carey and Siavelis (2005) examine how
Chile’s Concertacion party is able to hold together its coalition. The use
of complex informal incentives has proven effective at maintaining party
discipline. Chile’s electoral system uses two member districts with
proportional representation. It is not the two candidates with the most
votes that attain office rather it is the two parties that achieve the most
votes unless two candidates from the same party receive a super majority
of the vote.18 For this reason parties always place one strong candidate
with one weak candidate in districts where they are unlikely to achieve
the supermajority. In districts where a supermajority is possible two
strong candidates are paired together in the event the supermajority is
not achieved the unelected candidate is guaranteed a position in the
ministry of the executive the next time the party controls the executive.
Guatemala, in contrast, has a multitude of parties and party
discipline is non-existent. Party proclamations are only made around
election season and promises made are forgotten shortly after (Azpuru
2008). In the immediate transition to democracy political parties were
severely restricted (hence the semi-democratic nature of the current
regime). Even still the parties that did emerge were not strong, did not
subscribe to an ideology, fragmented overall, and no dominant party
emerged like in Chile (Granados 1992, 100). Guatemalan legislators

A supermajority would occur in one of two situations the same party receives twothirds of the vote or if both candidates (independently of each other) receive double the
vote of the third place candidate.
18
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wield

some

control

over

bureaucratic

appointments

but

any

appointments made have not been for the benefit of regulations.
Patronage appointments are made not to ensure re-election but to simply
earn money, vote buying is a common phenomenon in the state (Jonas
1995, 33). Electoral laws also restrict the ability of the indigenous
population to be represented at the national level. Each party must
achieve a minimum threshold in all the provinces to nominate a
candidate for national office (Mumme & Korzetz 1997, 48). Given the
high concentration of indigenous peoples in only the Northern provinces,
representation of their interests has been negligible. This has led to
frictions between the state and the indigenous populace. Many actions
are taken without the interests of the locals taken into consideration. For
this reason like in Chile the indigenous people have not adhered to
national laws. Legislators are given plenty of time to contemplate a bill
before it is voted upon. This time is used not to judge the merits of
proposed law rather it is to delay votes (Aleman 2006, 133).
The Bureaucracy
Chile has been effective at enacting the legislation it has passed;
there have been few rifts between elected officials and the bureaucracy.
The bureaucracy is formally controlled by the executive and the budget is
determined by the executive which strengthens executive influence over
the bureaucracy. As has been stated above many cabinet level positions
are granted as a result of risking one’s office for the benefit of the
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coalition. These positions can be seen as a form of patronage
appointments. The difference is that the individuals appointed to these
positions are from the same political party and are qualified in policy
formation. These two factors greatly distinguish Chile’s patronage
positions to that of Brazil where patronage appointments lead to
incompetent staff and disagreements within the executive branch. In this
regard Chile is closer to Costa Rica in its ability to enforce the laws that
it passes. This ability is not overwhelmingly seen by the citizenry where
only 53 percent, in 2005, believe the state is able to enforce the law
(Latino Barometer 2005).
The ministries are directed by an expert in that field and assist the
executive and the legislature in formulating policy which correctly
addresses potential problems. Many of the experts in the environmental
arena came to their positions from the position in the environmental
movement which pressured for greater environmental protection during
the Pinochet era. Carruthers (2001) has criticized this movement because
it has resulted in a “brain drain” within the environmental movement.
This change in position has resulted in good policy which has continued
to alleviate many environmental problems. Albeit the gradual approach
taken by the various ministries takes time and results are not easily
noticeable but the institutions need the time to adjust and learn from
their mistakes which is possible in Chile. Reform of state programs is
plausible which allows for improved policy over time. Despite the rise in
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certain environmental indicators the Chilean system is equipped to cope
with the deleterious effects of environmental degradation if compelled to
do so. The governing elite have been hesitant to enact reform which could
alienate the military and possibly lead to another coup19. For this reason
the Concertacion has intentionally designed policies to prevent the
unification of the political parties on the right. This has kept the
opposition fragmented and largely unable to prevent the state from
pursuing its agenda.
This could easily change though. It is the fear of a military
intervention and opposition to Pinochet that has kept the Concertacion
unified. Pinochet was increasingly marginalized and the political right
made progress in achieving a larger share of the electoral vote in
congressional and executive elections. If the Concertacion were to lose
the executive the position of executive level appointments would no
longer hold and the coalition would be less capable of a unified front.
Another weakness is the lack of oversight granted to the legislature vis a
vis the bureaucracy. The legislature is granted the ability to petition
ministers for questioning yet the minister can be as vague as he or she
desires (Siavelis 2000, 76). The executive maintains sole control over the
removal of ministers. This eliminates the ability of the legislature to
reprimand individuals for poor performance. Again the lack of resources

This is not a far fetched possibility in May of 1993 General Pinochet had public
buildings in Santiago surrounded by the military in response to human rights
investigations. Radical policies could have the same effect.
19
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and staff granted to legislators further hinders oversight capability.
Nevertheless, Transparency International has ranked Chile among the
least corrupt states in Latin America with one of the most responsive
bureaucracies (cited in Siavelis 2000, 94). This is subject to change when
the

Concertacion

coalition

loses

the

executive.

Since

democracy

reemerged the Concertacion has controlled both branches of the state
and there have been few issues of conflict between them.
The budgets of the two primary environmental protection agencies
are largely dependent on presidential discretion (Berger 1997, 104). Aside
from Guatemala being an economically poor state, environmental
protection has not been a priority of any of the governing regimes. This is
despite the desire of the people for environmental protection. For this
reason most financing for environmental projects has come from USAID
(ibid, 105).
Political parties in Guatemala are most concerned about patronage
appointments not to ensure re-election but simply to earn money
(Granados 1992, 103).

Civil society can provide oversight of polluting

industries by reporting violations to the National Environmental
Commission. However, this commission is weak and not well funded to
conduct the necessary investigations (Mumme & Korzetz 1997, 52). In
addition, the military is the largest benefactor of illegal cutting of timber
so any agency workers that attempt to issue citations are physically
threatened

(Berger

1997).

The
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military

once

again

prevents

environmental protection laws from being enacted with the exception of
when there is international involvement. The military is often the only
presence of the state in remote regions such as the Peten which is largely
inhabited by indigenous but is home to the largest forests in the state
(Finley Brook 2007, 104). The fear the indigenous have of the military
prevents any oversight of military actions. When the international
community is participating in an endeavor the military does not interfere
out of fear of repercussions from the international community.
State capacity in Chile and Guatemala is largely hindered by the
military. Chile has the capacity to protect the environment but military
prerogatives override civilian concerns. Guatemala also has the military
as an obstacle but even if the military were not an obstacle the capacity
would still be lacking. In Chile there is a bureaucracy that has the
human capital and the autonomy needed from the legislature to achieve
its mandate. However, the resources of the bureaucracy are controlled by
the executive who maintains control over the directors of the various
branches and over the budget of the various agencies. Autonomy is
hindered in so far as all social policy must begin with the executive. All
executives since Pinochet have refused to push social reforms out of fear
of military retribution. There is no life tenure system in place as is the
case in Brazil however the expertise accumulated in the bureaucracy and
the appointment of a cabinet member midway through an executive’s
term do grant the bureaucracy the autonomy needed to conduct its
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affairs with impartiality. The problem with the Chilean system is fear of
reprisals from the military. It is this omnipresent fear that prevents
reform from taking place. Guatemala lacks capacity in every way
possible. There is a dearth of expertise in the bureaucracy and
unwillingness among the political elite to engage in reform. Similar to
Chile this reluctance for reform is due to fear of military intervention.
However, without the military there would still be the fragmented party
system and the common practice of clientelism. Guatemala is the
archetype of a “personalist” state (Weyland 1994). This is when actors
within the state perform duties to enrich themselves not society as a
whole

(universalist)

or

even

particular

segments

of

society

(segmentalists). Rampant corruption at all levels of the state would also
prevent reform from occurring.
Civil Society
As has been stated civil society groups are often thought to be
most effective when there are multiple avenues to influence policy.
However, with power concentrated in the executive and that branch’s
unwillingness to alienate the business elite environmental pressure has
faced stiff resistance. For this reason most pressure for greater
environmental protection has come from abroad. Reasons for protecting
the environment are more the result of projecting an international image
than a true desire to protect the environment. It is believed free trade
agreements will require stricter environmental protection as a result
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Chile has continued the policies begun by Pinochet. The bi-lateral trade
pact the United States has in place with Chile did not require stricter
regulations it has simply required enforcement which Chile has done
(AJIL 2003). Chile has lacked autonomous organizations willing to press
the state on behalf of the people since democracy re-emerged (Oxhorn
1994, 63). The system that has emerged in Chile is largely identified by
the strength of political parties and the imbalance of power between the
executive and legislature. These two factors coupled with the hesitance to
alienate the business elite have led to the marginalization of civil society
groups which push for greater social welfare policies. Most experts left
civil society groups to work for the state yet these people have served to
implement policy not draft policy (Lambrou 1997, 112). The role that
environmental organizations have been relegated to is monitoring
compliance with laws. However, with the limited ability of the legislature
to compel the executive to enforce the law this role has minimal
significance.
Guatemalan

civil

society

organizations

like

those

in

Chile

encompassed many views and objectives. However, the transfer of power
in Chile led to the incorporation of environmentalists within the state
this has not been the case in Guatemala. Guatemalan environmentalists
had just as much success under civilian rule as they had under
authoritarian

rule

which

is

to

say

success

has

been

elusive.

Environmentalists joined the state and attempted to establish policy and
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carry it out but as stated above most endeavors were met with objection
by the military and the traditional elite. For this reason the relationship
has not lasted and civil society organizations have been called upon by
the state on an ad hoc basis to implement certain policies (Berger 1997,
114). Civil society is also expected to be able to contribute to better policy
by mobilizing the masses but mass mobilization is sparse in Guatemala
simply for safety reasons (Booth 2000, 60). Repression of social
movements is still common in Guatemala and repression is not restricted
to the indigenous. Gibson and Lehoucq (2003) found that the priority of
local officials is water, education, and energy production (40-41). The
emphasis on education is an avenue that civil society can use to educate
the public about the benefits of environmental preservation as has been
the case in Costa Rica. However, the fragmented nature of civil society
has prevented such efforts from emerging. Furthermore, even if there
was organization the military restricts all aspects of the policy process in
addition to the implementation of policy. Therefore, the main influence
area is the military which has completely ignored the environment in
favor of economic development which benefits themselves in addition to
the landed elite.
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Conclusions
The comparison of a democratic state with a semi-democratic state
has shown that as democracy emerges the importance of environmental
protection increases. This comparison has shown the complete neglect of
the environment by a military regime and a regime that does not
necessarily want to protect the environment but has been forced to by
international demands. Such demands have not been imposed upon
Guatemala simply because human rights have been the priority of the
international community. The belief that democracies will do a better job
at protecting the environment is apparent if only for the disregard of an
authoritarian rule. Conditions have steadily gotten worse in Guatemala
even after the transition to democracy whereas conditions have gotten
better in Chile on some indicators (see table 4). The reason for the
improvement on some indicators and not others is the emphasis given to
international demands. The international community has consistently
placed greater emphasis on deforestation and less on local conditions.
The same is true for Guatemala all international attention has been
focused on deforestation and not on water sanitation which is the main
priority of municipal governments.
Guatemala and Chile represent two ends of a continuum. Chile is
among the richer states in all of Latin America while Guatemala is at the
lower end of the spectrum. Guatemala can hardly be considered
democratic while Chile has certain undemocratic features. However, the
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democratic features that Chile does have has allowed for the successful
petition of international NGOs in collaboration with local groups to
ensure the continued protection of the environment. In contrast with the
subservience of all branches of the state to military interests no
organizations have been able to successfully implement environmental
programs of any kind.
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CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This work began by exploring a single topic – the relationship
between democracy and the environment. A few things have been
discovered along the way about what democracy is and is not. It has
been

shown

that

the

relationship

between

democracy

and

the

environment is contingent on a few factors which are reviewed below.
The Importance of Institutions
Advocates of democracy often conceptualize democracy to be a
panacea. This ignores political reality as it assumes all democratic states
are representative when they are not. As the cases of Brazil and Chile
show a state can be democratic and still not represent the interests of
the masses. The two states do not reflect public opinion for different
reasons though. Brazil is incapable of reflecting the interests of the
people as a result of weak party systems; whereas Chile does not as a
result of an excessive concentration of power within the executive
branch. These cases show how the representative nature of democracy is
contingent on the distribution of powers within the state. The founding of
a state can largely determine how representative the state will be.
Transitions take form a number of ways. There is transition from above
whereby the political elite grant democracy to the population (i.e.
Argentina and Chile) there is transition from below whereby the masses
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have forced democratization despite objections from the elite (e.g.
Venezuela and Mexico). These two processes typify Latin America
however

the

latter

is

especially

problematic

because

when

democratization from above occurs there are individuals who know they
can control the process. This is clearly the case with the transition for
Chile where Pinochet knew he could shape the outcome of democracy to
suit his interests. He may not have won the presidency but the
democracy that emerged was largely his creation and not against his best
interests. With democratization from below actors vying for political
power are working behind John Rawl’s “veil of ignorance” (1971). When
this takes place a more just and open society can be expected to emerge.
However, the states that have been most stable in Latin America have
been transitions from above (Karl 1990, 9). In most instances actors do
know their relative strength which makes bargaining and compromise
more difficult if a group has too much power it can be expected that the
political system that emerges will benefit that group more so than others.
In short the advocates of democracy focus too much on an
idealized form of what democracy should be and not on what democracy
is. Simply because a state has the procedural requirements of democracy
does not guarantee the state will reflect the interests of the masses.
State’s that lack representativeness will not perform the function that
Payne and others predict.

98

The case studies show the importance that political institutions
have

in

shaping

the

environmental

agenda.

Many

advocates

of

environmental protection propose working at the grass roots level to
further the cause of environmental protection. However, the central
government is where an abundance of resources lie. Even in states that
grant strong powers to the local government power tends to shift toward
the central government as has been the case in Costa Rica and the
United States. This is not to say that grass root initiatives are futile it is
simply to say greater power is centered in the central government.
Therefore, it is at the federal level that petitions must take place.
The case of Brazil shows how institutional gridlock and rent
seeking inhibit the ability of a democratic state with the resources and
the will from protecting the environment. In other words, limited state
capacity and institutional weakness at all levels have prevented civil
society organizations from petitioning the state as effectively as
democratic theorists predict. It also shows the importance of strong
political parties in the democratic process. Guatemala is another
example of weak political parties that if organized and disciplined might
be able to counter the influence of the military in social affairs. This work
agrees with Mainwaring and Scully (1995) insofar that parties “put order
into what would otherwise be a cacophony of dissonant conflicts” (3). The
strength of political parties has been to a large degree the source of state
capacity in Chile and Costa Rica.
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Do Democracies Protect the Environment Better?
The statistical analysis shows that democracies do not protect the
environment better than non-democracies. However, the statistical
analysis cannot account for the distribution of power within the state
and the role that political institutions have on the policy process. This
resulted in the needed for qualitative research. The case studies provided
show that a regime dominated by the military (Guatemala) gives no
regard to environment protection. The Guatemalan state has continually
acted contrary to conservation efforts as a result of its reliance on a
resource economy. Chile, which is also heavily dependent on its natural
resources, is more democratic than Guatemala and has greater state
capacity. However, in absolute terms Chile has degraded its environment
more than Guatemala has. It must be taken into account though that
economic development inherently requires pollution. There is no doubt
that Guatemala, if the opportunity arose, would pollute just as much as
Chile for economic gain. The environmental data indicate that pollution
has continued to increase in Guatemala while Chilean data has mixed
results. The mixed results of Chile indicate that given proper incentives it
does have the capacity to protect the environment. The substantive
difference is that Chile is attempting to protect the environment while
Guatemala is not.
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An even more democratic country than Chile is Brazil. Brazil has
the capacity and the demand among the population to protect the
environment. However, Brazil has not protected the environment as
much as theorists predict. This is a result of the fragmented nature of
the political system. In Chile there is too much power concentrated in the
executive whereas Brazil has too much power concentrated in the
legislature and local government. The Brazilian executive is unable to get
legislation passed as a result of weak parties. The bureaucracy is used
for rent seeking and maintains too much autonomy from elected officials.
Bureaucrats are difficult to remove and appointments are the result of
patronage not merit. In the Brazilian context the fragmented nature of
the political system has led to clientelistic behavior in all sources of
influence. As a result, the landed elite have continued to dominate the
political process and ensure their interests are not adversely affected.
The most democratic of all the states studied herein is Costa Rica
which has protected the environment more than any of the other states.
This is the result of an equal balance of power between the executive and
legislature which necessitates cooperation among branches to ensure
objectives are met regardless of which party controls either branch.
When democratic theorists are advocating the benefits of democracy
Costa Rica is the idealized state that is being referred to. The state has
the resources in terms of human capital and the demand from the
populace to protect the environment and it has responded. Civil society

101

organizations

have

been

effective

at

monitoring

enforcement

of

regulations and at pushing environmental conservation initiatives. This
is possible for two reasons. The first is there are several sources of
influence as the legislature, the executive, and bureaucratic agencies are
all susceptible to public pressure. The multiple avenues of influence are
a key factor lacking in both Chile and Guatemala. The second reason is
the lack of a threat from the military which is non-existent in Costa Rica.
Civil society is able to be effective because reform is possible in Costa
Rica. The ability to reform is in many ways a key variable to assure
environmental protection. Reform is something done either sparingly as
is the case with Guatemala or difficult to achieve as is the case with
Brazil and Chile.
The cases above demonstrate the importance that institutions have
on environmental protection. Without a system amenable to reform
improvements in the environmental arena will not be possible simply
because agencies will be unable to correct their mistakes. A legislature
responsive to citizen demands is necessary for reform of any kind to
come to fruition. The weak legislatures in Guatemala and Chile
demonstrate the inability of civil society to petition the government.
Brazil does not have a weak legislature rather it has a legislature that
serve only particular segments of the population with no regard for
government efficiency.
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What Does this Mean for Democracy?
Democracy is an essentially contested concept. Just about every
scholar has a different definition of the term. Democracy as the
introduction demonstrations can be operationalized in a number of
different ways. There are dichotomous forms, trichotomous forms, and
scores along a number line ranging from negative 10 to plus 10, and
from zero to one hundred. There are states that are clearly authoritarian
(i.e. the Congo under Mobutu; Liberia under Taylor) however even these
states represented the interests of some segments of the population. For
instance the United States is categorized as a democracy in the 1800s by
the Polity dataset despite widespread restrictions on suffrage; whereas
South Africa during apartheid was considered semi-democratic for the
same restrictions. What is the difference?
Many datasets continue to use a retrospective standard judging
democracies based on the standards of their day not based upon
procedural

requirements

(Paxton

2000).

Such

measures

are

underspecified and lead to confusion as to the transition to democracy.
Democracy is best viewed along a never ending continuum. By viewing
democracy along a never ending continuum we can account for
gradations of democracy over time within the state and notice
substantive differences in “representativeness.” States should not be
judged undemocratic simply because they do not meet the standards of
the day; rather they should be judged based on their own history with
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democracy. If a state has suffrage restricted based upon class but the
next year eliminate that restriction they are clearly more democratic
despite maintaining other restrictions. Democracy itself is in constant
flux and as a result must be considered on a continuum that will never
end (Markoff 1996). Mainwaring et al (2007) acknowledge the constant
changes in democracy and the difficulty in classifying representativeness
but refuse to attempt the measurement due to the high degree of
difficulty (128).
While there are various gradations of democracy there are two
discernible types of democracy. These are representative democracy and
procedural democracy. The former is procedural yet it entails a
representative function not inherent in the latter. Representative
democracies are those democracies where public opinion matters.
Procedural democracy has the electoral and civil liberties needed for
elected officials to have legitimacy from the masses but without
institutions responsive to the masses they cannot be considered
representative. Several indices measure procedural democracy but none
measure representativeness. For this reason statistical analysis that
attempt to use democracy as an explanatory variable will have
misleading

results.

The

absence

of

an

index

that

measures

representativeness necessitates qualitative research to determine the
source of responsive and effective government.
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Conclusions
This study has shown that the establishment of a democratic state
does not guarantee environmental protection. However, it should be clear
that environmental protection will not be provided under authoritarian
rule either. The military regime of Guatemala gives no regard to the
environment and the Chilean military regime only protected the
environment due to international pressure. The four case studies have
differing levels of democracy and differing levels of environmental
protection. It is noticeable that given the proper institutional structure,
the resources, along with the demand for environmental protection
democracies will protect the environment better than less democratic
states. There are a number of prerequisites for environmental protection
to occur. The first is the state must have the economic resources to make
protection feasible, second is the citizenry demanding such protection,
and finally is a state responsive to the populace. The final requirement
makes democracy a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
environmental protection.
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